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 Charkaoui and Bill C-3: Some 
Implications for Anti-Terrorism 
Policy and Dialogue between Courts 
and Legislatures 
Kent Roach 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration)1 and the government’s response to that decision in Bill 
C-32 bring together two areas of scholarly interest: anti-terrorism law and 
policy and Charter dialogues between courts and legislatures about the 
treatment of rights. The Court’s decision in Charkaoui that the absence 
of adversarial challenge to the secret information used by the 
government to justify detention and deportation of non-citizens was an 
unjustified violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms is an important example of the anti-majoritarian role of courts 
in protecting rights of the unpopular that were ignored in the legislative 
process.3 It is difficult to imagine a group — non-citizens alleged to be 
involved with terrorism — who would have less political power in a 
                                                                                                             
 
 Professor of Law, and Prichard and Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, University 
of Toronto. I thank Mathew Scott for excellent research assistance and acknowledge the continuing 
support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. 
1  [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui”]. 
2
  An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2008, c. 3.  
3
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. The theory of 
dialogue has sometimes been criticized for not justifying the judicial contribution to the dialogue. 
My own view is that the judicial role should be justified with respect both to the unique role of 
unelected judges in protecting vulnerable minorities as well as the role of courts in protecting 
fundamental principles such as adjudicative fairness that may be neglected by legislative and the 
executive branches that are more committed to responding to popular concerns such as public 
safety. See Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) c. 13. For a recent symposium examining many controversies about 
dialogue between courts and legislatures under the Charter, see “Charter Dialogue: Ten Years Later” 
(2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1-192. 
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democracy.4 The Court in Charkaoui shone a spotlight on the treatment 
of these outcasts and examined whether the government could advance 
its interests in secrecy and social protection in a manner that was more 
respectful of rights. It also found that Parliament had no valid rationale 
for subjecting foreign nationals without permanent residence status in 
Canada to much harsher treatment than permanent residents with respect 
to the judicial review of their detention.5 This is not to say that the 
Court’s decision was free from criticism, especially in its abrupt 
rejection of the non-citizens’ challenge under section 15 of the Charter 
and its deferral of deciding when indeterminate detention becomes 
unconstitutional and unhinged from the prospect of deportation. The 
Court might have decided more, but what it did decide was important 
and beneficial.  
Consistent with the theory that the Charter promotes dialogue 
between courts and legislatures as an alternative to either judicial or 
legislative supremacy, the Court in Charkaoui allowed Parliament to 
select the precise means to increase adversarial challenge to security 
certificates. It outlined a range of less rights-restrictive alternatives and 
gave Parliament a year to fashion a legislative response to the decision 
by suspending its main declaration of invalidity for 12 months. The 
Court protected the rights of the unpopular, but recognized the ability of 
Parliament to select and establish the precise means to provide 
adversarial challenge to the secret evidence/intelligence used to support 
detention and deportation under a security certificate. The Court’s 
suspended declaration of invalidity, however, meant that the successful 
applicants in the case did not receive an immediate remedy for their 
victory in court. This raises the question of whether the wait for the 
enactment of Bill C-3 as the ultimate remedy was worth it.  
Serious concerns have been raised about both the process and 
substance of the government’s response to Charkaoui.6 There was little 
apparent consultation before Bill C-3 was introduced into Parliament on 
October 22, 2007.7 The Bill was debated in the Commons Public Safety 
                                                                                                             
4
  But see as well Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, 2008 SCC 28 (S.C.C.) 
holding that the s. 7 rights of a Canadian citizen accused of involvement with Al Qaeda and of 
killing an American soldier in Afghanistan were violated by the non-disclosure of records of 
interviews with him by Canadian officials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  
5
  Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at paras. 88-89. 
6
  See Craig Forcese & Lorne Waldman, “A Bismarckian Moment: Charkaoui and Bill  
C-3” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 355 [hereinafter “Forcese & Waldman”]. 
7
  In its response to the delayed three-year review of the Anti-terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, 
c. 41, the government signalled in July 2007 only that it would study “the possibility of establishing 
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and National Security committee for only six days, with four of those 
days being allocated to non-governmental witnesses. Some amendments 
were proposed by that Committee and made to the Bill with respect to 
the status and selection of special advocates, but they did not address the 
major criticisms of the Bill in relation to the ability of the special 
advocate to have contact with the detainee after having seen the secret 
evidence or to demand further disclosure from the government. The Bill 
was debated over eight days in the House of Commons but over only 
two days in the Senate as the deadline for the suspension of the 
declaration of invalidity approached. The Bill was only given first 
reading in the Senate on February 6, 2008 and was passed on February 
12, 2008, less than two weeks before the Court’s declaration of 
invalidity would take full effect. After having held hearings for one day 
in a marathon 10-hour session, the Special Senate Committee on Anti-
Terrorism law pointedly commented that it “would have appreciated 
more time to reflect upon all aspects of this bill and the views of those 
concerned, given the life-altering effects that security certificates have 
on those named in them, and the reflection the process has on Canadian 
society and values”.8  
Although it facilitated a legislative reply to Charkaoui, the 
suspended declaration of invalidity, coupled with the government’s 
decision not to introduce the Bill until eight months after the Court’s 
decision, produced a rushed parliamentary debate. The Bill was passed 
in the House of Commons by a vote of 197 to 71. The political debate 
about Bill C-3 was also affected by the reluctance of the official 
Opposition to defeat the minority government on an issue that was 
presented as implicating public safety. There was no provision in Bill C-
                                                                                                             
a special advocate role in the security certificate process” but provided no rationale for why it had 
apparently rejected alternative models for adversarial challenge or alternative models of special 
advocates. “Response of the Government of Canada to the Final Report of the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security on the Review of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act” July 2007. On the contrast between the laconic response by the Canadian government and the 
more detailed response by the British government which at the same time issued six detailed 
discussion documents and invited public consultation on its proposed anti-terrorism legislation see 
Kent Roach, “Better Late than Never? The Canadian Parliamentary Review of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act” (2007) 13(5) Choices 1, at 27 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Better Late Than Never?’  ”].  
8
  Second Report of the Special Senate Committee on the Anti-Terrorism Act, February 
2008. This Committee has developed considerable expertise with respect to anti-terrorism law and 
policy over the years. See Kent Roach, “The Role and Capacities of Courts and Legislatures in 
Reviewing Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Law” (2008) 24 Windsor Rev. Legal Soc. Issues 5, at 17-18 
[hereinafter “Roach, ‘Role and Capacities of Courts’  ”]. 
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3 to require a subsequent parliamentary review of its operation.9 The 
rushed process that was used to enact Bill C-3 left much to be desired.10  
On its substantive merits, Bill C-3 has been criticized for selecting 
the least robust form of adversarial challenge outlined by the Court, 
namely, the British system of security-cleared special advocates. Special 
advocates under Bill C-3 will be able to challenge the government’s 
claims that evidence must be kept secret and the relevance and reliability 
of the secret evidence. They will not, however, be able to consult the 
detainee or other persons after they have seen the secret evidence, 
demand further disclosure from the government or call their own 
witnesses without prior judicial approval. In this respect, special 
advocates have less power than counsel for the Security Intelligence 
Review Committee (“SIRC”), the review body for Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (“CSIS”), that used to review security certificates. 
They also have less powers than counsel for public inquiries such as the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Activities of Canadian Officials in 
Relation to Maher Arar (the “Arar Commission”). Commission counsel 
had powers to demand full disclosure from the government, call 
witnesses and consult with the affected person after having seen the 
secret information. These powers were not explicitly denied to special 
advocates under Bill C-3,11 but they require the approval and supervision 
of the specially designated judges of the Federal Court who preside over 
security certificate cases.12 Bill C-3 also does not follow section 38 of the 
Canada Evidence Act (“CEA”),13 which allows a Federal Court to 
balance the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in 
                                                                                                             
9
  The Senate Special Committee is, however, conducting a continuing review of the 
legislation and is expected to issue its continuing review by the end of 2008. 
10
  Forcese & Waldman, supra, note 6. For similar observations about the rushed nature of 
the debate about the Anti-terrorism Act enacted in the aftermath of 9/11, as well as the debate about 
the expiry of investigative hearings and preventive arrests in 2007, see Kent Roach, September 11: 
Consequences for Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queens, 2003) c. 3 and Roach, “Better Late than 
Never?”, supra, note 7, at 8-11. One of the advantages of the judicial process over the legislative 
process is that the former generally has adequate time for reflection and deliberation on the issues. 
See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1986). 
11
  David Dunbar & Scott Nesbitt, “Parliament’s Response to Charkaoui: Bill C-3 and the 
Special Advocate Regime under IRPA” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 415. 
12
  Bill C-3 also gives the Federal Court a degree of ownership over special advocates by 
providing that the Chief Justice of the Federal Court and the Chief Justice of the Federal Court of 
Appeal shall establish a committee to make rules for special advocates: Bill C-3, s. 85.6. On the role 
of the Federal Court in security certificates, see Benjamin Berger, “Our Evolving Judicature: 
Security Certificates, Detention Review, and the Federal Court” (2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 101.  
13
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 
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secrecy and to order the disclosure of information that may harm 
national security. Under Bill C-3, the Federal Court must still not 
disclose any information to the detainee once it determines that its 
disclosure would harm national security or any other person. Despite the 
initial euphoria at the Court victory, the end result of the dialogue was a 
disappointment for many.  
In this article, I will use the Charkaoui case and its legislative 
aftermath as a case study in the development of anti-terrorism policy and 
dialogue between courts and legislature. The study of dialogue — or 
what some might wish to describe less metaphorically as the institutional 
role of and exchanges between courts and legislatures — should 
examine what courts and legislatures actually do and not be based on 
idealized visions of either institution. The back and forth between courts 
and legislatures has been a feature of not only recent Canadian debates 
about anti-terrorism law, but also those in the United Kingdom and the 
United States.14 The Charkaoui and Bill C-3 dialogue provide evidence 
of the strengths and weaknesses of both courts and legislatures in dealing 
with anti-terrorism laws.15 It is by no means clear that either courts or 
legislatures are handling the challenges of responding to terrorism very 
well.  
The dialogue model of judicial review seeks to find and justify time 
and space for legislative responses and democratic debate about court 
decisions about rights and freedoms. The dialogue model does not, 
however, guarantee that legislatures will necessarily fill the policy space 
that is available to them or that it will do so wisely. Indeed, the 
possibility of legislative failure and short-sightedness underlines that 
dialogue is a genuine democratic dialogue and not simply one where the 
legislators follow the orders of the judges. Bill C-3 also reveals a 
phenomenon that is often neglected by critics of judicial activism,16 
namely, that elected governments and legislatures are frequently happy 
to defer some issues to the judiciary. As will be seen, Bill C-3 defers to 
the judiciary the critical decisions about whether the special advocate 
can obtain full disclosure, call witnesses and consult the detainee after 
having seen the secret information. It also leaves the question of the 
                                                                                                             
14
  Kent Roach, “Sharpening the Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade of Scholarship” (2007) 
45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 169, at 186-89. 
15
  For a broader review of this question see Roach, “Role and Capacities of Courts”, supra, 
note 8. 
16
  For an exception see Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences 
of the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).  
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limits of indeterminate detention under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter to 
the decisions of courts in particular cases. Finally, it leaves the related 
question of whether Canada will breach its international law obligations by 
deporting people to torture to the decisions of judges in applying the 
Suresh17 exception despite recommendations by a number of parliamentary 
committees that Parliament reject the use of such an exception. Charkaoui 
and Bill C-3 will not resolve democratic debates about security certificates.  
In this essay, I will first examine the Court’s decision in Charkaoui. 
Charkaoui is best known for its holding that the absence of any 
adversarial challenge to the secret evidence presented by the government 
violated the detainee’s right to know the case to be met under section 7 
of the Charter. The Court held that this violation could not be justified 
under section 1 because of the existence of a number of alternative 
measures that would infringe the detainee’s rights less while still 
respecting the government’s objectives of protecting secrets. The Court’s 
survey of less rights-invasive alternatives was wide-ranging and included 
the British special advocate system, the former system used to review 
security certificates by SIRC, the use of undertakings by the accused’s 
lawyers in the Air India trial and the use of the national security 
confidentiality proceedings in section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act. I 
will suggest that the Court may have misunderstood the use of security-
cleared counsel in the Arar commission and that this is an example of the 
need for courts to be cautious about opining about possible responses by 
legislatures to its decisions. The very fact that the Court mentioned the 
British special advocate seemed to have been interpreted by some as a 
sort of pre-approval of that scheme, even though the Court correctly 
noted that there has been a number of serious criticisms of special 
advocates in the United Kingdom on the grounds that they could not 
generally call witnesses or have discussions with the affected person 
after having seen the classified material.18 One of the values of dialogue 
is that it allows for further research by the executive and the legislature 
into the range of possible responses to the Court’s decisions19 and 
democratic debate and choice about those options. 
                                                                                                             
17
  Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 
1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
18
  Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at para. 83. 
19
  Although the judiciary, assisted by law clerks, can also conduct research, this research is 
restricted to library research whereas both the executive and legislative committees can consult 
experts and even visit other countries to explore other policy options. For an examination of the 
number of witnesses consulted by parliamentary committees that have examined anti-terrorism laws 
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It will be suggested that the Court’s summary dismissal of the claims 
that the security certificate procedure violated section 15 is problematic 
in a number of respects. In contrast to the House of Lords in its 
Belmarsh decision,20 the Court failed to explore the rationality of using 
immigration law as anti-terrorism law. The Court’s decision that the 
indeterminate detention of the detainees did not violate sections 7 and 12 
is also problematic. The Court seemed to accept that the long-term 
detention of the three men was still justified because it remained 
connected to the prospect that they could be deported if their certificates 
were upheld. The Court’s approach may be formally and technically 
correct, but only because of the strange absence on the record of the 
cases of findings that the men in the case (particularly Hassan Almrei 
who would be deported to Syria, but also Adil Charkaoui who would be 
deported to Morocco and Mohamed Harkat who would be deported to 
Algeria) would be tortured if deported to their countries of citizenship.21 
Nevertheless, if one accepts that the men would face a substantial risk of 
torture if returned to their home countries then the only connection with 
possible deportation is to invoke the Suresh exception that would allow 
deportation to a substantial risk of torture.  
The Court’s refusal to explore the limits of indeterminate detention 
and the related issue of whether deportation to torture could be justified 
can be defended as one-case-at-a-time constitutionalism minimalism 
advocated by Cass Sunstein.22 Constitutional minimalism may serve the 
                                                                                                             
as well as a criticism of the shortage of research support for such committees see Roach, “Better 
Late than Never?”, supra, note 7. For proposals for greater use of expert committees see Craig 
Forcese, “Fixing the Deficiencies in Parliamentary Review of Anti-Terrorism Law: Lessons from 
the United Kingdom and Australia” (2008) 14(6) Choices. 
20
  A. v. Secretary of State, for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 
(U.K.H.L.). 
21
  Both Amnesty International and the U.S. Department of State have expressed concerns 
about the torture of suspected terrorists in Morocco, Syria and Algeria as well as Egypt, to which 
Mahmoud Jaballah and Mohamed Majoub, the other security certificate detainees, face deportation. 
See Amnesty International, Morocco/Western Sahara: Torture in the “Anti-Terrorism” Campaign 
— the case of Témara Detention Centre (AI Index: MDE 29/004/2004), June 2004; Syria: Unfair 
Trial and Sentencing of Muhammad Haydar Zammar: Appeal Case Update 3 (AI Index: MDE 
24/020/2007), March 2007; Algeria: Torture in the “War on Terror”: A Memorandum to the 
Algerian President (AI Index: MDE 28/008/2006), April 2006; Egypt: Systematic Abuses in the 
Name of Security (AI Index: MDE 12/001/2007). See also the Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices issued by the United States Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights 
and Labor for each of Morocco (March 2006), Syria (March 2006), Algeria (March 2007) and Egypt 
(March 2007). 
22
  Cass Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Cass Sunstein, “Minimalism at War” (2004) Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 47. See also Neil S. Siegel, “A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at 
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institutional interests of the judiciary in keeping their “powder dry”,23 but 
in this context, it will likely extend the detention of men who have been 
detained many years under immigration law even though in all 
likelihood, they cannot be deported without running a substantial risk of 
torture. 
In the second section, I will examine the way in which Bill C-3 
responds to the Court’s decision in Charkaoui. Bill C-3 contemplates 
that special advocates will challenge the government’s argument that 
evidence cannot be disclosed to the detainee because of harms to 
national security and other persons and that special advocates can 
challenge the secret evidence that is submitted. That said, Bill C-3 
contains a very broad prohibition on the ability of the special advocate to 
consult any person about the case after the special advocate has 
examined the secret information. It delegates decisions about whether 
the special advocate can, after having seen the secret information, have 
contact with detainees or indeed anyone else about the information and 
whether the special advocate can obtain further disclosure and call 
witnesses to the decisions of the presiding Federal Court judge. This 
delegation of critical issues to judges suggests that legislatures may 
have an interest in avoiding some of the most contentious policy issues. 
It also increases the likelihood that in subsequent Charter challenges to 
Bill C-3, the courts will find that a judge has erred on the facts of a 
particular case as opposed to striking down Bill C-3 as a whole. In other 
words, the one-case-at-a-time constitutional minimalism of the Court’s 
decision in Charkaoui is echoed in a one-case-at-a-time approach in Bill 
C-3 to judicial authorization of the ability of the special advocate to 
exercise powers beyond challenge to governmental claims of secrecy 
and to the reliability and relevance of the secret evidence.  
Another feature of Bill C-3 is that it follows the Supreme Court’s 
ruling that the deferral of judicial review of detention for non-citizens 
who are not permanent residents could not be justified and that it 
provides for the same requirements for judicial review of all detentions 
under security certificates. This raises the issue of whether dialogue 
between courts and legislatures most often result in the latter obeying the 
                                                                                                             
the Supreme Court Bar” (2005) 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1951; Cass Sunstein, “Testing Minimalism: A 
Reply” (2005) 104 Mich. L. Rev. 129. For Canadian support of constitutionalism minimalism in the 
different context of Aboriginal rights litigation see Patrick Monahan, “The Supreme Court in the 
21st Century” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 374, at 391-97. 
23
  The phrase is that of my colleague David Dyzenhaus. See David Dyzenhaus, “Legality in 
a Time of Emergency” (2008) 24 Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues 1, at 2.  
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rulings of the former. It will be suggested that in some cases, there may 
be little viable alternative than to follow the thrust of a court’s ruling, but 
that even in those cases, the legislature retains the option to make subtle 
variations on the court’s rulings. 
I will also examine the few instances in which Bill C-3 expands the 
policy debate beyond a precise response to Charkaoui and addresses 
other questions. These other questions include recognition of the ability 
of the special advocate to challenge the relevancy and reliability of the 
secret evidence, to challenge secret evidence on the basis that it was 
obtained as a result of torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment, 
the recognition of the use of house arrests for security certificate 
detainees as an alternative to imprisonment, the recognition of limited 
appeals and the recognition of the ability to authorize the release of 
security certificate detainees to allow them to leave Canada for a third 
country. 
In the third section, I will examine Bill C-3 as an example of 
truncated dialogue both with respect to security certificates and with 
respect to the treatment of secret information in all legal proceedings, 
most notably under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act. Although 
some may be tempted to see Parliament’s response to Charkaoui as a 
sign that security certificates can be “Charter proofed”, I will suggest 
that many other Charter issues remain surrounding the issue of long-term 
indeterminate detention and the related issue of deporting a person to a 
substantial risk of torture. With respect to the treatment of secret 
information, Bill C-3 takes a narrow approach to the use of special 
advocates and rejects the advice of two parliamentary committees that 
special advocates be available with respect to other procedures where the 
government uses secret evidence or is allowed to make ex parte 
submissions that the disclosure of information will harm national 
security. The government’s partial response leaves the availability of 
special advocates to be litigated in a case-by-case manner. It also does 
not respond to documented recent cases in which the government has 
overclaimed national security confidentiality or the need for Canada to 
reform and discipline the process in which national security confidentiality 
is claimed. Such a process would make criminal prosecutions a more 
viable alternative to reliance on immigration law security certificates.  
My conclusion will assess the lessons of Charkaoui and Bill C-3 
both for the development of fair and effective anti-terrorism policy and 
for dialogue between courts and legislatures about the treatment of the 
rights of the unpopular. The end result of this dialogue has been to 
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achieve a fairer security certificate process, but not one that is 
sustainable from either a rights or a security perspective. The Court’s 
summary treatment of the equality rights claims allowed it to avoid the 
discussion of the rationality and proportionality of using immigration 
law with its ultimate remedy of deportation as anti-terrorism law. The 
Court also avoided the critical question of when indeterminate detention 
becomes unconstitutional in part by implicitly relying on the disturbing 
possibility that the three men could still be deported to Syria, Algeria or 
Morocco. The Court’s minimalist approach to these issues set the stage 
for a legislative reply that was similarly minimalist in only providing 
special advocates for security certificate proceedings and not addressing 
larger issues concerning the treatment of secret information or the 
sustainability of security certificates. Even with respect to special 
advocates, the government made a conscious decision to delegate some 
of the most contentious issues in the legislation to the judiciary, thus 
suggesting that governments may often find it attractive to do so.  
Bill C-3 will not end Charter litigation or continued debate about 
security certificates. Indeed, the dialogue so far has only deferred the 
critical questions of when indeterminate detention under security 
certificates becomes unconstitutional; whether deportation to a 
substantial risk of torture will be allowed or whether a special advocate 
should be allowed to seek further disclosure or consult the detainee after 
having seen the secret information. 
II. CHARKAOUI  
1. The Court’s Decision 
In Charkaoui, the Court described the security certificate regime in 
the following revealing terms: 
Confidentiality is a constant preoccupation of the certificate scheme. 
The judge “shall ensure” the confidentiality of the information on 
which the certificate is based and of any other evidence if, in the 
opinion of the judge, disclosure would be injurious to national security 
or to the safety of any person: s. 78(b). At the request of either minister 
“at any time during the proceedings”, the judge “shall hear” information 
or evidence in the absence of the named person and his or her counsel 
if, in the opinion of the judge, its disclosure would be injurious to 
national security or to the safety of any person: s. 78(e). The judge 
“shall provide” the named person with a summary of information that 
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enables him or her to be reasonably informed of the circumstances 
giving rise to the certificate, but the summary cannot include anything 
that would, in the opinion of the judge, be injurious to national security 
or to the safety of any person: s. 78(h). Ultimately, the judge may have 
to consider information that is not included in the summary: s. 78(g). 
In the result, the judge may be required to decide the case, wholly or in 
part, on the basis of information that the named person and his or her 
counsel never see. The named person may know nothing of the case to 
meet, and although technically afforded an opportunity to be heard, 
may be left in a position of having no idea as to what needs to be 
said.24 
The Court thus accepted the idea that the security certificate process was 
one driven by secret evidence. The process could result in unfairness to 
the detainee by justifying his detention and possible deportation on the 
basis of evidence never seen by the detainee or his counsel.  
The Court in a unanimous judgment by the Chief Justice held that 
the use of secret evidence violated the section 7 rights of the detainee. 
The Court took a contextual approach to interpreting the Charter right, 
rejecting the idea that section 7 did not apply in the immigration and 
security contexts. It concluded that the impugned scheme placed the 
burden of ensuring the fairness and the accuracy of the decision “entirely 
on the shoulders of the designated judge”, adding: 
… Those shoulders cannot by themselves bear the heavy burden of 
assuring, in fact and appearance, that the decision on the reasonableness 
of the certificate is impartial, is based on a full view of the facts and 
law, and reflects the named person’s knowledge of the case to meet. 
The judge, working under the constraints imposed by the IRPA, simply 
cannot fill the vacuum left by the removal of the traditional guarantees 
of a fair hearing. The judge sees only what the ministers put before him 
or her. The judge, knowing nothing else about the case, is not in a 
position to identify errors, find omissions or assess the credibility and 
truthfulness of the information in the way the named person would be. 
Although the judge may ask questions of the named person when the 
hearing is reopened, the judge is prevented from asking questions that 
might disclose the protected information. Likewise, since the named 
person does not know what has been put against him or her, he or she 
does not know what the designated judge needs to hear. If the judge 
cannot provide the named person with a summary of the information 
that is sufficient to enable the person to know the case to meet, then the 
judge cannot be satisfied that the information before him or her is 
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sufficient or reliable. Despite the judge’s best efforts to question the 
government’s witnesses and scrutinize the documentary evidence, he or 
she is placed in the situation of asking questions and ultimately deciding 
the issues on the basis of incomplete and potentially unreliable 
information.25 
Although the Court rejected the idea that the reviewing Federal Court 
judges were no longer independent and impartial and praised the Federal 
Court for adopting a “pseudo-inquisitorial role”,26 it raised concerns 
about the factual and legal accuracy of decisions that were made without 
effective adversarial challenge.27  
The Court also resisted the idea that the interpretation of section 7 
rights should be collapsed into the process of attempting to justify 
violations of rights under section 1 of the Charter. The Chief Justice 
stressed that “the issue at the s. 7 stage, as discussed above, is not 
whether the government has struck the right balance between the need 
for security and individual liberties; that is the issue at the stage of s. 1 
justification of an established limitation on a Charter right. The question 
at the s. 7 stage is whether the basic requirements of procedural justice 
have been met …”. This division between the section 7 and section 1 
issues is appropriate because it allows the courts to insist on basic 
fairness under section 7 while facilitating a structured inquiry into the 
proportionality of any departures from these standards under section 1 of 
the Charter. Although dicta that suggest that section 7 violations can 
never be justified under section 128 may be intended to strengthen section 
7 rights, they actually diminish the scope of those rights and allow the 
government to avoid having to justify limits on rights and demonstrate 
their proportionality.29 
Having concluded that the existing scheme violated section 7 of the 
Charter because the detainee could not know and challenge the case 
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  Id., at para. 63. 
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  Id., at para. 51. 
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against him, the Court then considered whether the state could justify the 
procedures under section 1 of the Charter. The Court adverted to its prior 
jurisprudence which effectively had eliminated the ability to justify 
violations of section 7 under section 1 of the Charter, but noted that such 
justifications “may not be impossible”.30 The effect of discussing the 
alternatives to the existing procedure under section 1 was to place the 
burden on the government to justify departures from basic standards of 
adjudicative fairness. In general, the government is in the best position to 
be able to marshal the evidence to justify limitations on rights. This is 
particularly true in the national security context where the applicants not 
only have less resources than the state, but often lack basic information 
about the rationale of the state’s national security activities because of 
the secrecy that surrounds them.31 The Charter applicants in this case had 
been excluded from secret hearings in their case for years and it would 
have been particularly inappropriate to require them to demonstrate why 
these hearings were not necessary. The burden of justification for such 
extraordinary procedures should be on the government. 
2.  The Court’s Discussion of Alternatives to the Existing Regime of 
Secret Evidence 
The Court readily accepted that the protection of secret information 
was a pressing and substantial objective that could justify the limitation 
of Charter rights, noting that “Canada is a net importer of security 
information. This information is essential to the security and defence of 
Canada, and disclosure would adversely affect its flow and quality.”32 In 
the end, however, the Court found that the government had not 
demonstrated the proportionality of the limitation because there was a 
range of alternatives that would provide for adversarial challenge to the 
government’s secret evidence while respecting the need to keep the 
information secret. The Court quite appropriately discussed a range of 
less rights-invasive alternatives. The primary purpose of this discussion 
was to explain and justify the Court’s decision to strike the impugned 
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scheme down as an unjustified violation of the Charter. At the same 
time, such a discussion of alternatives also provided policy-makers with 
important information about what sort of a new scheme could pass 
constitutional muster. Indeed it is likely that this part of the judgment 
was read closely by the policy-makers and government lawyers who 
drafted the legislative reply to the Court’s decision. In subtle but 
important ways, the way the Court discusses possible less drastic 
alternatives can shape the eventual legislative reply and for this reason it 
is important for the Court to be careful about what signals and hints it 
sends to policy-makers. 
(a)  The SIRC Model 
The Court spent the most time discussing the role played by SIRC in 
investigating security certificates before they were issued. This role 
applied to all security certificates until 1988 and to security certificates 
issued against permanent residents until 2002. The Court stressed that 
“independent security-cleared SIRC counsel” would cross-examine 
CSIS witnesses when the affected person was excluded from the hearing 
and then “would negotiate the contents of the summary with CSIS, under 
the supervision of the presiding SIRC member. … These procedures 
illustrate how special counsel can provide not only an effective 
substitute for informed participation, but can also help bolster actual 
informed participation by the affected person.”33 The Court relied on an 
article by a former independent counsel for SIRC.34 Although the article 
makes a valuable contribution about practices that were not widely 
known, it focused on complaints that were heard by SIRC about the 
denial or withdrawal of security clearances and not on security 
certificates. The article also did not explicitly address the critical 
questions of whether SIRC counsel would consult with the affected 
parties after having seen the secret information about possible lines of 
cross-examination or whether SIRC counsel would seek further 
disclosure. The article also examined the alternative of allowing the 
complainant’s own counsel to obtain a security clearance and see the 
secret information while warning about the dangers to CSIS and allied 
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agencies of any leaks of the secret information.35 The Court’s reliance on 
this article reflects its reliance on library research.36 The executive and 
Parliamentary committees would not be limited to such forms of 
research and could question various representatives of and counsel for 
SIRC about the workings of the system. For this reason, the Court’s 
discussion of policy alternatives in section 1 analysis should not be 
treated as the final or definitive word about the specific policy 
alternative.  
(b)  The Section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act Model 
The Court also examined the role of the judge in balancing the 
interests of secrecy and disclosure under section 38 of the Canada 
Evidence Act, which allows the government to seek non-disclosure 
orders from specially designated judges of the Federal Court in civil, 
criminal and administrative proceedings on the basis that the harm of 
disclosure to national security, national defence or international relations 
is greater than the public interest in disclosure. The Court noted that the 
impugned immigration law procedure did not allow the judge to weigh 
the competing interests but rather “requires judges not to disclose 
information the disclosure of which is injurious to national security or 
the safety of any person”.37 The Court also noted that unlike the 
immigration law procedure, the CEA “makes no provision for the use of 
information that has not been disclosed”.38 Although it can be used in 
civil and administrative proceedings, the practical implication here is 
that secret evidence is not used in criminal trials.39 In addition, the trial 
judge retains a full discretion under section 38.14 to fashion any remedy 
that is necessary to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial in light of the 
Federal Court’s non-disclosure order. This remedy could include a stay 
of proceedings, and such a remedy has indeed been ordered in a case in 
which two men were originally convicted in 1986 of conspiring to blow 
up an Air India plane.40  
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  Id., at 196. 
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The treatment of those accused of terrorism crimes under section 38 
of the Canada Evidence Act would be a main feature of a comparison 
between the treatment of citizens and non-citizens thought to be 
involved with terrorism, but the Court was cautious about such a 
comparison observing that “the CEA does not address the same 
problems as the IRPA, and hence is of limited assistance here …”.41 The 
Court did not really explain the rationale for this conclusion. This is 
unfortunate because the Court’s conclusion may have encouraged the 
government to reject section 38 of the CEA as a model for the reform of 
the immigration law.42 If judges are allowed to balance the competing 
interests in disclosure and non-disclosure in criminal trials, or indeed in 
the broad range of proceedings including public inquiries, civil lawsuits 
and other administrative proceedings, to which section 38 applies, it is 
not clear why the immigration context requires non-disclosure once any 
injury to national security from the disclosure of the information is 
established. 
(c) The Undertaking of Counsel in the Air India Trial Model 
The Court also examined the procedure used in the Air India trial in 
which sensitive material was disclosed to counsel for the accused on 
initial undertakings that the information not be shared with the accused 
or any other person. The Court had appeared to express misgivings about 
this approach in its 2004 decision in the Air India investigative hearing 
case43 but these misgivings were not repeated here, perhaps because the 
Court had subsequently approved a similar undertaking by counsel 
process in the access to information context in order to preserve 
confidentiality.44 The Court in Charkaoui did note, however, that 
“[d]isclosure in a specific trial, to a select group of counsel on 
undertakings, may not provide a working model for general deportation 
legislation that must deal with a wide variety of counsel in a host of 
cases. Nevertheless, the procedures adopted in the Air India trial suggest 
that a search should be made for a less intrusive solution than one found 
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in the IRPA.”45 This statement, however, overestimates the number of 
security certificate cases and the fact that the detainees have been 
represented by a small group of experienced counsel. Indeed, as will be 
seen, three lawyers who have represented detainees in security certificate 
cases have qualified as special advocates under the regime established by 
Bill C-3. 
The approach used in the Air India trial can be defended on the basis 
that the client would have to consent to the initial undertaking. It 
recognizes that the affected person’s lawyer will know the most about a 
case, but is not simply an agent for the client.46 In both the United States 
and Australia, disclosure to the affected person’s lawyer is sometimes 
made on the condition that the lawyer obtain a security clearance, in 
addition to the condition that the secret information not be disclosed to 
the client. 
Some of the advantages of allowing the detainee’s lawyer to obtain 
access to the secret evidence on the condition of obtaining a security 
clearance may be achieved under the new special advocate regime in Bill 
C-3 because two experienced lawyers who represented the security 
certificate detainees, Paul Copeland and John Norris, have been 
appointed and qualified as special advocates and have, subject to the 
decision of the presiding judge, been allowed to act as special advocates 
in the cases subject to undertaking that they cease acting as counsel for 
their former clients in the open proceedings, as well as in related 
matters.47 The government had objected to the two lawyers serving as 
special advocates on the basis of concerns about conflict of interest and 
inadvertent disclosure of secret material. The former concern is difficult 
to understand as the special advocate and the detainee’s own lawyer 
would have the same interest in challenging both the secret evidence and 
the government’s claim to secrecy. The government’s concern about 
inadvertent disclosure of secret information would seem to be the nub of 
the matter. As will be seen, however, this concern discounts the ability 
of commission counsel for the Arar Commission to have contact with the 
affected person without disclosing secret information. 
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(d) The British Special Advocate Model 
The Court also discussed the British special advocate system as a 
more proportionate alternative to the system in the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) which provided no adversarial 
challenge to the secret evidence. To its credit, the Court recognized that 
British special advocates had been criticized on the basis that “(1) once 
they have seen the confidential material, they cannot, subject to narrow 
exceptions, take instructions from the appellant or the appellant’s 
counsel; (2) they lack the resources of an ordinary legal team, for the 
purpose of conducting in secret a full defence; and (3) they have no 
power to call witnesses”.48 The Court also noted that rules established for 
the Special Immigration Appeals Commission allowed the government to 
object to any proposed communication between the special advocate and 
the affected person and his or her counsel after the special advocate had 
seen the secret information. 
Most criticisms of British special advocates have focused on their 
practical inability to consult the affected person after having seen the 
secret information, but the concerns about inadequate disclosure are also 
very serious. A study conducted by Craig Forcese and Lorne Waldman 
revealed that some British special advocates that they interviewed 
expressed concern about the adequacy of disclosure they received. Some 
reported receiving redacted information or summaries of the information 
and complained that they did not always have access to those within 
security agencies who collected the information.49 These reports are at 
odds with past reports that suggested that the government had adequately 
disclosed to the special advocates material adverse to its case or helpful 
to the excluded person’s case.50 They also explain why Forcese and 
Waldman recommend not only that special advocates be able to ask 
questions of the named person after seeing the secret information, but 
also that there be some means of ensuring that the government has made 
full disclosure to the special advocate. I agree with their analysis about 
the critical importance of full disclosure.  
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The issue of full disclosure is complicated by the learning about 
tunnel vision in wrongful conviction cases.51 Tunnel vision refers to a 
process in which authorities, often with the noblest of intentions, fixate 
on a person’s purported guilt, discount or ignore information that points 
to the person’s innocence and interpret ambiguous and even innocent 
information as evidence of a person’s guilt. Tunnel vision is not 
necessarily the product of deliberate misconduct by officials, but can be 
the product of institutional pressures that increase as the state has 
invested much time and resources in focusing on a suspect. The practical 
concern is that CSIS might possess material in its files that someone 
representing the detainees might be able to use as evidence to undermine 
the case against the detainee. To the extent that the cases rely on 
intelligence provided by foreign agencies, it may be impossible to ever 
obtain full disclosure. There is a danger that the foreign agency may 
selectively provide intelligence to Canadian officials or be affected by 
tunnel vision which ignores or explains away potentially exculpatory 
information. 
(e) The Arar Commission Model  
The Court discussed how the Arar Commission handled the challenges 
of reconciling the need for secrecy with the need for disclosure in one 
brief paragraph. It noted that the commission of inquiry was subject to 
section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act and commented that “[t]o help 
assess claims for confidentiality, the Commissioner was assisted by 
independent security-cleared legal counsel with a background in security 
and intelligence, whose role was to act as amicus curiae on confidentiality 
applications. The scheme’s aim was to ensure that only information that 
was rightly subject to national security confidentiality was kept from 
public view. There is no indication that these procedures increased the 
risk of disclosure of protected information.”52 This comment 
unfortunately suggests that the Court may not have fully understood how 
the Arar Commission handled the challenges of secret information. 
Although the Court was correct in noting that security cleared amicus 
curiae played a role in the Arar Commission in challenging the 
government’s national security confidentiality (“NSC”) claims, it neglected 
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the more important place of security-cleared commission counsel in 
ensuring that a full investigation took place and, where appropriate, 
challenging governmental witnesses who presented evidence in the 
closed hearings.  
The fundamental role played by security-cleared commission 
counsel in the Arar Commission was carefully explained by Justice 
O’Connor in his public report. He explained that Commission counsel 
had top secret security clearances and made numerous demands for 
disclosure and obtained access to over 21,500 full text documents before 
redaction.53 In light of the fact that many of the hearings were held in 
camera with Mr. Arar and his counsel excluded and because counsel for 
the Attorney General of Canada represented all departments and did not 
explore differences in position between them, O’Connor J. explained 
that he “instructed Commission counsel to test the in camera evidence 
by means of cross-examination, when necessary. Thus, as one of the 
steps in preparing to examine witnesses in camera, Commission counsel 
met periodically with counsel for Mr. Arar and for the intervenors to 
receive suggestions about areas for cross-examination. In the in camera 
hearings, if Commission counsel thought it necessary, witnesses called 
by the Commission were cross-examined, whether the Government agreed 
or not. Commission counsel cross-examined many of the witnesses, 
sometimes vigorously, and did so with considerable effectiveness.”54 
The amicus curiae that was the focus of the Supreme Court’s 
attention had a more limited role than Commission counsel in the Arar 
Commission. They had access to all the documents that Commission 
counsel had, but they did not meet with counsel for Mr. Arar or the 
intervenors or cross-examine governmental witnesses. Rather, they 
“made submissions about the substance of the Government’s NSC 
claim”, issues that should be addressed in the Commission’s report, and 
what parts of the report should be made public.55 
Thus the central role of Commission counsel in the Arar Commission 
included (1) ensuring that the government fully disclosed all documents 
that were relevant to the inquiry’s work; (2) calling relevant witnesses; 
(3) obtaining from counsel for the excluded parties suggestions for 
cross-examination of key witnesses; (4) challenging when appropriate 
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through cross-examination evidence presented in in camera proceedings; 
and finally (5) challenging the government’s NSC claims. The amicus 
curiae in contrast only played a key role with respect to challenging 
NSC claims and making representations about what material could be 
disclosed publicly. 
Justice O’Connor added in his discussion of the central role of 
Commission counsel that “having Commission counsel incorporate into 
witness examinations the perspectives of those who had an interest, but 
could not take part in the proceedings, helped to address the substantial 
shortcomings in the process resulting from the exclusion of those parties”.56 
Justice O’Connor characterized Commission counsel as “independent 
counsel”. He stressed that if independent counsel were effectively to test 
the evidence they “must have access to all relevant documents and must 
be given the time and facilities to properly prepare”.57  
A failure to understand the respective roles of Commission counsel 
and the amicus curiae in the Arar Commission is more than a historical 
quibble. It may have affected the design and adequacy of the 
government’s response to Charkaoui in Bill C-3, including Parliament’s 
judgment about the risk of inadvertent disclosure of secret material by a 
security-cleared counsel such as Arar Commission counsel who 
communicated with the affected person and his lawyer after having seen 
the secret material. Indeed, the special advocates provided for under Bill 
C-3 may turn out to play a role similar to that played by the amicus 
curiae in the Arar Commission and by British special advocates. In other 
words, special advocates under Bill C-3 are best equipped to challenge 
governmental claims of national security confidentiality. Unlike 
Commission counsel in the Arar Commission or counsel representing 
SIRC, it is unclear whether special advocates will have the power (1) to 
demand that the government disclose more relevant information, (2) to 
call evidence to ensure that all relevant information has been presented 
or (3) to consult with the affected person after they had access to the 
secret information. 
Although an Arar-style amicus curiae could play a valuable role in 
challenging potentially overbroad secrecy claims made by governments 
in security certificate cases, it would not necessarily make the process 
significantly fairer for the detained person. There is a danger that new 
security-cleared counsel inserted into the security certificate process 
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might not have the power to dig up new information held by the 
government or by third parties that mitigates or casts doubt on the 
information submitted by the government. There is also a danger that 
new security-cleared counsel might not, after seeing the secret 
information, be able to obtain information from the affected person or 
his counsel that might be necessary to make full answer and defence to 
the secret information. As will be seen, the presiding judge under Bill C-
3 can allow the special advocate to have contact with the detainee and 
his counsel after having seen the secret information, but may be reluctant 
to do so because of concerns about the inadvertent disclosure of secret 
information. Although the Supreme Court’s brief discussion of the Arar 
Commission does not make this clear, the judge should understand that 
commission counsel in the Arar Commission, not the amicus curiae, 
were able to discuss matters with Mr. Arar and his counsel after having 
seen the secret information with no concerns being raised that they 
inadvertently disclosed secret information. 
The Supreme Court’s neglect of the central role of commission 
counsel in the Arar Commission is also unfortunate because the Court 
elsewhere expressed a concern that one of the flaws of the present 
security certificate system was that the reviewing judge might not have 
access to all the relevant information. At several junctures in Charkaoui 
the Court stressed that one of the problems with the hearings was that the 
detainee was not in an informed position to demand full disclosure from 
the government of all the relevant information. Chief Justice McLachlin, 
for example, stated that “the judge sees only what the ministers put 
before him or her”.58 She added: “the judge’s activity on behalf of the 
named person is confined to what is presented by the ministers”.59 These 
statements suggest that the Court may not have been persuaded that the 
duty placed on Crown counsel to make full disclosure was an adequate 
response to the unfairness of ex parte proceedings. Again, commission 
counsel, as opposed to amicus curiae, could respond to such concerns 
because only commission counsel or independent counsel representing a 
review body such as SIRC would have powers to investigate all of 
CSIS’s files to determine whether there was other relevant information 
that would be of assistance to the security certificate detainee. 
The role of commission counsel, like the former role of independent 
counsel representing SIRC, provided a solid Canadian-built foundation 
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for designing a response to Charkaoui. The independent counsel in both 
proceedings can be distinguished from the Arar amicus curiae and 
British special advocates on the basis that they have powers to demand 
that the government produce all relevant evidence, if need be by calling 
witnesses. The Air India trial model would also allow the lawyer to 
make further demands for disclosure. 
(f) Summary 
Both the Arar commission counsel and the SIRC models, as well as 
the Air India model, allow the independent counsel to consult with the 
affected person after the independent counsel has seen the secret evidence. 
In this manner, they avoided the most notorious problem with the British 
special advocate procedure. That said, however, the difficulties of 
independent counsel obtaining important information from the affected 
person without revealing secrets should not be underestimated. In this 
respect, it may be significant that Arar Commission counsel conducted 
most of the discussions with Mr. Arar’s counsel. Although counsel owes 
a strong duty of loyalty and confidentiality to his or her clients in our 
legal system, they also have sometimes neglected duties as members of 
the bar and officers of the court.60 In some cases, including in the Air 
India trial, counsel have agreed to initial undertakings not to disclose 
information to their clients. Such undertakings alter the traditional 
solicitor client relationship and require the informed consent of the 
client. Nevertheless, they may present a means to obtain information that 
will assist in the defence of a case without risking that secrets will fall 
into the hands of the affected person. Even without such undertakings, 
there may be less of a risk that secrets will be inadvertently divulged if 
discussions are conducted on a counsel-to-counsel basis. Although they 
can be expected to share vital information with their client and take 
instructions from them on vital steps of the proceedings, counsel have 
independent obligations to the administration of justice. They are not in 
every respect the alter ego of their client.61  
Another possibility that is used in Australia and the United States is 
to allow counsel the option of seeking security clearances as a way of 
obtaining access to secret information. Although such a process might 
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restrict choice of counsel and be resisted by the bar, it also has the 
potential to increase the amount of information in the hands of the 
counsel with the final and ultimate responsibility of defending the 
affected person.  
The Arar Commission’s example of independent security-cleared 
commission counsel is a better model for a security-cleared counsel in 
security certificate proceedings than the security-cleared amicus curiae 
used by the Arar Commission. Commission counsel, unlike the amicus 
curiae, had legal powers to demand full disclosure of secret material 
from the government; to call and cross-examine witnesses that had 
relevant information and to consult the affected parties (often through 
counsel) after having seen the secret information. Although an Arar-style 
amicus curiae can help ensure an adversarial challenge to governmental 
claims of secrecy, such counsel is at a disadvantage with respect to 
ensuring that the affected person’s full answer and defence interests are 
represented in any revised security certificate process. An amicus curiae 
will not generally have the power or means to ensure that the 
government has made full disclosure of all relevant information or to call 
and cross-examine witnesses or to consult with the affected party.  
3. The Dangers of Judicial Pre-approval of Legislative Responses 
The Court’s discussion of the more proportionate policy alternatives 
in Charkaoui demonstrates some of the danger of judicial pre-approval 
of Parliament’s response to its decision. As suggested above, the Court 
seemed to have misunderstood the Arar Commission experience, and 
this may have influenced Parliament’s eventual response. Its discussions 
of both the SIRC experience and the Air India trial experience could 
have been supplemented by fuller information. The Court also appeared 
to discount the relevance of the experience under section 38 of the 
Canada Evidence Act and the Air India undertakings without providing 
full reasons for these conclusions. 
Part of the advantage of dialogic models of constitutionalism is that 
they allow the executive and the legislature to research the full range of 
responses to the Court’s decision. The executive and parliamentary 
committees should be able to more fully investigate the policy alternatives 
to the status quo than the judiciary which is generally restrained by the 
material presented to them. Judges can of course supplement the record 
in a case with library research but conventions of judicial behaviour 
would prohibit direct consultation with those who may have information 
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about policy alternatives that cannot be found in a library. There is much 
to be said for a conception of the judicial function that limits itself to 
deciding whether an impugned law is constitutional and leaves to the 
legislature the task of devising new laws.62 Hence, there should not be 
too much judicial prompting about how the legislature should respond to 
a Charter decision if the government is to be free to explore the full 
range of dialogic options, including those that might not have been 
anticipated or fully researched by the Court. That said, one should not be 
too critical of the Court in Charkaoui. In order to justify its decisions, 
courts will often have to demonstrate a range of less rights-invasive 
means of satisfying the government’s policy objectives. Any court that 
found the status quo with respect to security certificates to be 
unconstitutional would be obliged to demonstrate that there were better 
ways to reconcile the government’s interest in protecting secrets with 
fairness to the accused.  
The Court in Charkaoui also demonstrated that it was aware of the 
major criticism of the British special advocate system when it cited the 
report of the Constitutional Affairs Committee that had stressed the 
disadvantages of special advocates in consulting with the affected person 
once they had seen the secret material and their inability to call 
witnesses or demand disclosure.63 Nevertheless, it is significant that 
Parliament eventually opted for special advocates as opposed to the 
independent counsel for SIRC or the Arar Commission, section 38 of the 
Canada Evidence Act or the Air India trial models. In other words, 
Parliament selected the only alternative that the Court recognized had 
been subject to criticism and the one alternative that arguably achieves 
the worst job of all the alternatives in ensuring fair treatment of the 
affected person. This suggests that courts should be careful not to appear 
to endorse any particular response to their Charter decisions and that the 
legislature may have an incentive to pick the alternative policy response 
that is the least generous to the affected individuals and the most 
compatible with the interests of the government. The government has an 
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incentive to maximize protections of national security confidentiality, 
especially in cases where the government is relying on secret intelligence 
provided to Canada by more powerful allies. This tendency is if anything 
stronger in the immigration law context given that non-citizens do not 
have the vote and courts have traditionally accepted departures from 
standards of adjudicative fairness in immigration proceedings that would 
not be tolerated in criminal trials.64 Indeed the Court’s statement in 
Charkaoui that “Parliament is not required to use the perfect, or the least 
restrictive, alternative to achieve its objective”65 may have played a role 
in encouraging the adoption of the option that the Court itself recognized 
had been subject to the most criticism and was the most restrictive of the 
ability of the security cleared lawyer to communicate with others after 
having seen the secret information or to demand further disclosure from 
the government. 
4. The Need for Prompt and Continuous Review of Detention  
Although the Court rejected the argument that the automatic 
detention of those named in the certificate was arbitrary, it held that 
delaying the review of the detention of foreign nationals until after the 
reasonableness of their certificates was decided violated sections 9 and 
10(c) of the Charter, especially when compared to the automatic review 
within 48 hours required for permanent residents. Although courts are 
loathe to second guess legislative classifications, they should not hesitate 
to take a hard look at the rationale for such distinctions when liberty is at 
stake. The state was not able to put forth a rationale for this differential 
treatment and the Court’s remedy of applying the review provisions for 
permanent residents to foreign nationals had immediate effect.66 
The Court also placed considerable stress on the need for continuous 
review of the detention of detainees under the security certificate regime. 
The Court concluded that sections 7 and 12 of the Charter require “a 
meaningful process of ongoing review that takes into account the context 
and circumstances of the individual case”.67 The government will bear a 
higher burden as the period of detention increases both because the 
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danger of a person may decline and the government will have more time 
to collect evidence. Although the Court does not directly address this 
possibility, it is not unreasonable to conclude that long periods of 
detention should place the state in a position where it should have 
enough evidence to charge a person criminally or else allow the person 
to be released, initially subject to conditions. The realistic possibility or 
impossibility of deportation should also be a factor, but this is not 
spelled out by the Court. Unfortunately, the Court avoided this issue. It 
simply noted that all three applicants claimed they would be tortured if 
returned to their home country but that “in each of their cases, this 
remains to be proven as part of an application for protection under the 
provisions of Part 2 of the IRPA. The issue of deportation to torture is 
consequently not before us here”.68 Although technically correct, this 
conclusion ignores the fact that all of the security certificate detainees 
come from countries with poor human rights records and some come 
from countries such as Syria and Egypt that are notorious for torturing 
suspected terrorists. It would be unfortunate if the hopefully remote 
possibility of allowing a person to be deported to a substantial risk of 
torture was used as a means to preserve a tenuous nexus between 
detention and deportation.  
The continuing review scheme contemplated by the Court is meant 
to be a demanding and robust one. For example, the Court indicated that 
any requirements that the detainee present new evidence or a material 
change in circumstances to justify a review would violate sections 7 and 
12 of the Charter.69 The Court refused to invalidate IRPA on its face for 
not placing any limits on detention or not requiring that the detention be 
related to a realistic possibility of deportation. Nevertheless, it hinted 
that prolonged detention could be found to violate sections 7 and 12 of 
the Charter at some point in the future. The Court’s approach to the 
indeterminate detention issue adopts a form of one-case-at-a-time 
minimalism that Cass Sunstein has argued is particularly appropriate to 
ration the use of judicial powers during emergencies.70 The Court’s one-
case-at-a-time approach, however, does not maximize the space for 
legislative policy-making as Sunstein suggests that it should. Rather, it 
leaves the existing legislation intact but uncertain as both detainees and 
governments wait and speculate about the particular point of time in 
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which courts will conclude that detention has become constitutionally 
excessive. At that point of time, the courts will fashion a case-specific 
remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter while leaving the constitutional 
scheme intact.  
5. The Court’s Conclusion on Equality Rights 
The Court’s summary dismissal of the detainees’ equality rights 
claims is disappointing, especially when compared to the House of Lords 
approach to equality in the Belmarsh case.71 The Supreme Court’s 
rationale for holding that there is no equality violation was its assertion 
that, unlike citizens, non-citizens do not have an independent right to 
remain in Canada under section 6 of the Charter coupled with the 
Court’s statement that detention has not yet “become unhinged from the 
state’s purpose of deportation”.72 The Court’s justification is presumably 
its conclusion that none of the three applicants had reached the point 
where it has been determined that they were in need of protection from a 
substantial risk of torture if deported.73 But at least with respect to 
Hassan Almrei who was born in Syria, it would be shocking if a 
substantial risk of torture was not found. If this is accepted, the only 
possible connection between Mr. Almrei’s continued detention and the 
unique immigration remedy of deportation is the possible use of the 
Suresh exception.  
The Court’s summary dismissal of the equality claim also avoided 
comparing the long-term indeterminate detention of non-citizens 
suspected of involvement with terrorism with the more limited tools 
available to the state with respect to citizens suspected of involvement 
with terrorism. Those charged with terrorism offences have Charter 
rights to a trial in a reasonable time and not to be denied reasonable bail 
without just cause. They have broad rights to disclosure of relevant 
information held by the state, subject only to non-disclosure applications 
under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act which, as the Court noted, 
does not allow the use of secret evidence. Section 38.14 of the CEA also 
allows a trial judge to fashion whatever remedy is necessary to protect 
the accused’s right to a fair trial because of the non-disclosure of secret 
                                                                                                             
71
  A. v. Secretary of State, for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 
(U.K.H.L.). 
72
  Charkaoui, [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at para. 131 (S.C.C.). 
73
  Id., at para. 15. 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) CHARKAOUI AND BILL C-3 309 
information. Citizens can be subject to peace bond provisions under 
section 810.01 of the Criminal Code or the now-expired preventive 
arrest provisions of section 83.3, but only for a year.74 The Court did not 
conduct a full section 15 analysis, which would have required it to select 
a comparator group or reflect on the position of non-citizens suspected 
of terrorism.  
The Court’s summary conclusion that section 15 was not violated 
precluded it from examining under section 1 of the Charter whether the 
singling out of non-citizens suspected of terrorism for harsher treatment 
under IRPA compared to the criminal law could be justified under 
section 1 of the Charter. Such an analysis would have required the Court 
to address questions of rational connection, proportionality and overall 
balance between the treatment of non-citizens and the important objective 
of preventing terrorism. Such an analysis would have raised some 
difficult questions about the use of immigration law as anti-terrorism 
law. The legislative objective for any section 15 violation would likely 
have been the need to protect the security of Canada whereas the 
legislative objective that was used to determine whether the denial of a 
fair hearing under section 7 could be justified under section 1 of the 
Charter was the state’s need for secrecy, not security. The House of 
Lords in the Belmarsh case focused on the legislative objective of 
security as a possible justification for the differential treatment of non-
citizens. It concluded that there was not even a rational connection 
between the prevention of terrorism and the singling out of non-citizens 
suspected of terrorism. The House of Lords also raised questions about 
the utility of deportation as a tool in the fight against international 
terrorism.75 Even if the Court in Charkaoui had deferred on the rational 
connection issue, it still would have had to grapple with whether 
criminal prosecutions were a more proportionate means for the state to 
protect itself against non-citizens involved with terrorist organizations 
than reliance on security certificates that in these cases were only 
tenuously tied to the possibility of deportation. The important issues of 
whether the use of immigration law as anti-terrorism law was rational 
and proportionate were avoided in Charkaoui because of the Court’s 
blunt conclusion that no section 15 violation had been established. The 
absence of proportionality analysis on security issues may also help 
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explain why Parliament’s ultimate response to Charkaoui did not explore 
the long-term sustainability of security certificates as anti-terrorism law.  
6. The Court’s Remedy 
The Court delayed for 12 months its declaration of invalidity with 
respect to those parts of the legislation that authorized the government to 
make unchallenged ex parte representations to the Court.76 Although the 
Court did not cite the Schachter v. Canada77 categories for when it will 
be appropriate to suspend a declaration of invalidity, it is reasonably 
certain that they applied the public danger category given the Court’s 
conclusion that the signing of a certificate constituted a determination of 
dangerousness. The Court indicated that the unconstitutional provisions 
could be applied during the 12-month delay, but that at the end of this 
time 
the certificates of Mr. Harkat and Mr. Almrei (and of any other 
individuals whose certificates have been deemed reasonable) will lose 
the “reasonable” status that has been conferred on them, and it will be 
open to them to apply to have the certificates quashed. If the government 
intends to employ a certificate after the one-year delay, it will need to 
seek a fresh determination of reasonableness under the new process 
devised by Parliament. Likewise, any detention review occurring after 
the delay will be subject to the new process.78 
The Court’s choice of a 12-month delay might reflect its judgment 
about the minimal amount of time that was necessary to devise and enact 
new legislation. A six-month delay might have been an unrealistically 
short time to allow the government to draft legislation and to allow 
Parliament to debate it. That said, the government kept most of its work 
internal until eight months after the decision when Bill C-3 was given 
first reading. There was then a rushed parliamentary debate with the 
threat of the expiry of the Court’s suspension of its declaration of 
invalidity hanging over the heads of the Parliamentarians. There is a 
tension in the dialogical model between giving legislatures enough time 
to respond to court judgments and minimizing the period of time during 
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which individuals suffer the effects of unconstitutional laws.79 An 18-
month suspension would have given Parliament more time to debate its 
response, but it would also have increased the harms to the detainees 
who were detained under a law that had been found to be unconstitutional. 
It is also possible that government could have taken even longer before 
introducing its bill had an 18-month suspension been used. 
Some might question why a suspended declaration of invalidity was 
used at all.80 In this case, the detainees received no immediate benefit 
from their victory in Court and this is certainly contrary to traditional 
declaratory approaches associated with Blackstone and Dicey which 
stress the connection between rights and remedies and generally produce 
retroactive remedies or at least remedies that have immediate prospective 
effect.81 It can be argued that detention under an unconstitutional law is 
in direct conflict with the direction in section 52 of the Constitution Act, 
1982 that unconstitutional laws are of no force and effect. That said, it 
may be unrealistic to expect the courts to take responsibility for the 
release of individuals that the government claims are dangerous. In this 
vein, it is significant that the House of Lords in its justly celebrated 
Belmarsh case also employed a remedy that did not result in the release 
of the detainees. Although it may have been unrealistic to have expected 
the Court to have struck down the law and ordered the release of those 
detained under it, the Court might have done more to minimize the harm 
caused to the successful applicants during the one year in which the 
declaration of invalidity was suspended. 
One way of resolving the tension between giving Parliament adequate 
time for deliberation and minimizing harms to those detained under an 
unconstitutional law is for the Court to take supervisory steps to limit the 
harms to the successful applicants during the period of suspension. For 
example, an independent lawyer who already had a security clearance 
might have been allowed to see the secret evidence in the cases and to 
challenge the government’s claims of secrecy. This may have led to 
more information being made available to the detainees and their 
lawyers even while the declaration of invalidity was suspended. Another 
possibility was expedited review of the conditions of release of detainees. 
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Unfortunately, no steps were taken in this case to minimize the harms of 
the unconstitutional law during the 12 months that the Court’s remedy 
was suspended. 
There is a danger that an emphasis on dialogue between courts and 
legislatures may result in the affected individuals getting lost in the 
institutional interplay. The Court’s judgment does not even provide basic 
details about the three men including the lengthy periods of detention 
and complex procedural history of their cases, the allegations that they 
face, or their countries of origin to which they face deportation. The 
Court may have been reluctant to say much about the detainees because 
it was not privy to the secret evidence that the government presented 
against the men and the secret evidence had never been subject to 
adversarial challenge. Nevertheless, courts should attempt to tell the 
public about all litigants who appear before them. Courts should also 
recognize that a large part of the justification for their role in institutional 
dialogue is the unique ability of courts to render justice to aggrieved 
litigants who cannot find relief from other branches of government. 
7. Summary 
The Court’s unanimous decision in Charkaoui is far from the 
unambiguous victory for the detainees that it was initially presented as in 
the media. The Court’s treatment of equality issues and its deferral of the 
issue of the ultimate constitutionality of indeterminate detention was 
troubling. The Court never really answered the question of why long-
term detention without trial and secret evidence was acceptable when 
applied against non-citizens when they would be unacceptable if applied 
to citizens. The Court’s use of one-case-at-a-time constitutional minimalism 
on the indeterminate detention issue ignored the long periods of 
detention already suffered by the detainees and the difficulties of 
deporting them without a substantial risk of torture. It sent the message 
that the government could continue to detain these men until at some 
time in the future, some judge declares that enough is enough. The Court 
never grappled with the (ir)rationality of using immigration law with its 
ultimate and problematic remedy of deportation as anti-terrorism law, as 
did the House of Lords in its Belmarsh case.82  
The Court made a firm statement about the need for adversarial 
challenge to the state’s case in order to satisfy the principles of 
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fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. On the issue of both 
justification under section 1 of the Charter and the ultimate remedy, the 
Court deferred to Parliament by simply outlining a range of less rights-
intrusive alternatives. Although it was necessary for the Court to justify 
its decision that the present system of no adversarial challenge was 
unconstitutional, such surveys must be conducted with care lest the 
Court misunderstand the policy alternatives or appear to pre-approve any 
particular alternative. The Court’s use of a suspended declaration of 
invalidity allowed Parliament to make policy choices and enact Bill C-3, 
but it did not guarantee that Bill C-3 or other aspects of security 
certificates will not be found to violate the Charter in future cases.83 The 
Court’s judgment started a process that will marginally improve the 
fairness of the security certificate process, but it rejected many of the 
other claims made by the applicants including their claims of unequal 
and discriminatory treatment when compared with the treatment received 
by citizens suspected of involvement in terrorism. The Court also did not 
place any limits on the indeterminate detention of the applicants or reject 
the possibility that they might be deported even if they faced a substantial 
risk of torture.  
III. THE LIMITED DIALOGIC RESPONSE IN BILL C-3  
In October 2007, the government introduced Bill C-3 providing for 
special advocates but only for use with respect to immigration law 
security certificates. As will be discussed below, the government did not 
follow the advice of both House of Commons and Senate committees 
that had recommended a wider use of special advocates whenever the 
government used secret evidence as well as in the ex parte part of 
proceedings under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act to obtain non-
disclosure orders. The fact that Bill C-3 only authorized the use of 
special advocates under IRPA was indicative of a general failure of Bill 
C-3 to expand the policy debate with the Court. The Court had only 
decided the issue under the IRPA and Parliament responded in a similar 
narrow manner.  
                                                                                                             
83
  For an example of a legislative reply that was itself held to be unconstitutional, see Sauvé 
v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.). See also 
Peter Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited — or 
‘Much Ado About Metaphors’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at 19-25, 46-51; Kent Roach, 
“Sharpening the Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade of Scholarship” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
169, at 174-76.  
314 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
1. The Role of Special Advocates 
The special advocates contemplated in Bill C-3 are in some respects 
closer to the Arar commission’s model of amicus curiae than the role of 
Commission counsel during the Arar Commission or the role of 
independent counsel for SIRC. Bill C-3 defines the duties of special 
advocates as follows: 
85.1(1) A special advocate’s role is to protect the interests of the 
permanent resident or foreign national in a proceeding under any of 
sections 78 and 82 to 82.2 when information or other evidence is heard 
in the absence of the public and of the permanent resident or foreign 
national and their counsel. 
(2) A special advocate may challenge 
(a)  the Minister’s claim that the disclosure of information or other 
evidence would be injurious to national security or endanger 
the safety of any person; and 
(b)  the relevance, reliability and sufficiency of information or 
other evidence that is provided by the Minister and is not 
disclosed to the permanent resident or foreign national and 
their counsel, and the weight to be given to it. 
. . . . . 
85.2 A special advocate may 
(a)  make oral and written submissions with respect to the 
information and other evidence that is provided by the 
Minister and is not disclosed to the permanent resident or 
foreign national and their counsel; 
(b)  participate in, and cross-examine witnesses who testify 
during, any part of the proceeding that is held in the absence 
of the public and of the permanent resident or foreign national 
and their counsel; and 
(c)  exercise, with the judge’s authorization, any other powers that 
are necessary to protect the interests of the permanent resident 
or foreign national.84 
The Minister is only obliged to disclose the secret evidence that is 
presented to the judge.85 The special advocate can challenge both the 
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government’s claim to secrecy and the relevance, reliability and sufficiency 
of the secret evidence. 
2. Section 85.2(c) and Additional Powers that are Necessary to 
Protect the Detainee  
Section 85.2(c) will be critical in determining whether the special 
advocate has a role similar to that played by the Arar Commission’s 
amicus curiae or the more robust role played by Arar Commission 
counsel or SIRC counsel. It is under subsection (c) that a judge will 
decide whether the special advocate can consult with the detainee and 
his counsel after having seen the secret information presented by the 
Minister and whether the special advocate will be able to demand the 
disclosure of evidence possessed by the Minister or call witnesses. 
Although the requirement for judicial authorization was designed in part 
to respond to the risk of inadvertent disclosure of the secret information, 
the only statutory criteria in section 85.2(c) is whether a requested power 
is “necessary to protect the interests of the permanent resident or foreign 
national”. This in itself is a fairly stringent standard that requires the 
judge to conclude that the requested power is necessary and not just 
advisable in order to protect the interests of the non-citizen. 
The ability of the special advocate to consult with the detainee or 
other experts about the secret information, as well as the special 
advocate’s ability to demand further disclosure and call witnesses, can 
be critical to protecting the interests and defending the detainee. The 
proposed legislation essentially delegates the questions of whether the 
special advocate will be able to play such a role to the specially 
designated judge of the Federal Court who hears the case. Such 
delegation may allow the courts to expand the role of the special 
advocate in ways not specifically contemplated by Parliament if the 
judge determines that the new functions of the special advocate are 
necessary to protect the interests of the detainee. At the same time, 
presiding judges might take a restrictive view of what is necessary to 
protect the interests of the detainee. An important issue will be whether 
the judge’s perceptions of the risks of inadvertent disclosure of secret 
information influences his or her approach to determining what is 
necessary to protect the detainee’s interests. Such an approach would run 
contrary to the wording of the text and ignore the Court’s observation in 
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Charkaoui86 that with respect to the SIRC process that “there is no 
indication that these procedures increased the risk of disclosure of 
protected information”. At the same time, there are other parts of Bill C-
3 which signal a concern about the risk of inadvertent disclosure of 
information. Section 83(1.2) provides that a judge could deny a detainee’s 
request for a specific special advocate because the special advocate 
already has had access to information that would be injurious to national 
security or endanger the safety of a person and in the circumstances 
“[t]here is a risk of inadvertent disclosure of that information or other 
evidence”. This provision seems to discount the fact that security cleared 
counsel who have acted for both SIRC and Arar Commission were able 
to interact with affected people without inadvertently disclosing secret 
information.  
The Commons committee that conducted the three-year review of 
the Anti-terrorism Act considered the practice of the Arar Commission 
during which Commission counsel with security clearances consulted 
with counsel for Mr. Arar and special security-cleared counsel challenged 
the government’s case for secrecy. As the Commons committee noted, 
“The functions performed by the amicus curiae were somewhat different 
[than those of Commisson counsel]. During in camera hearings, he was 
mandated to make submissions challenging the national security 
confidentiality claims made by government agencies in opposition to the 
public disclosure of sensitive information. His function was to advocate 
in favour of accountability and transparency in the public interest.”87 The 
Senate committee specifically recommended that “[t]hat the special 
advocate be able to communicate with the party affected by the proceedings, 
and his or her counsel, after receiving confidential information and 
attending in camera hearings, and that the government establish clear 
guidelines and policies to ensure the secrecy of information in the 
interest of national security”.88 The Senate committee’s approach built on 
Canada’s experience with security-cleared lawyers conferring with the 
affected person both during the Arar commission and during the process 
that was used by the Security Intelligence Review Commission to review 
security certificates.  
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Parliament’s delegation of the most critical issues to Federal Court 
judges casts some doubt on those who argue that judicial activism is a 
power grab by the judges and their supporters.89 The reasons for 
increased judicial power in modern societies are more complicated. 
Delegation of tough issues to the courts can avoid debate and conflict 
when legislation is being enacted. The fact that Bill C-3 was enacted just 
as the 12-month suspension of the declaration of invalidity was about to 
expire may have given the government an incentive to make the reply 
legislation as uncontroversial as possible. In addition, the delegation of 
these issues to the Federal Court could be attractive because it can be 
assumed that the court’s decisions will establish and follow relevant but 
perhaps unclear constitutional standards. Even if the presiding judge 
denies a special advocate an opportunity to contact the detainee or obtain 
further disclosure when such actions are required to ensure that the 
detainees’ right to know and challenge the case are satisfied, the eventual 
remedy for any violation of section 7 of the Charter will be limited to the 
facts of the particular case and not result in a wholesale invalidation of 
the act. In this respect, Bill C-3 is a legislative mirror of the one-case-at-
a-time orientation of the judicial minimalism advocated by Cass Sunstein. 
3. The Broad Restrictions Placed on Special Advocates After They 
Have Examined the Secret Evidence 
The restrictions imposed on the special advocate after having seen 
the secret information that the Minister presents to the judge apply not 
only to consultation with the detainee and his lawyers, but to all other 
persons. Section 85.4(2) provides that “After that information or other 
evidence is received by the special advocate, the special advocate may, 
during the remainder of the proceeding, communicate with another 
person about the proceeding only with the judge’s authorization and 
subject to any conditions that the judge considers appropriate.” Read by 
itself this provision is overbroad because it could restrict the special 
advocate from communicating about non-secret parts of the proceedings 
with other persons or from communicating with other special advocates 
or others with security clearances about the proceedings. The ability of 
special advocates to make effective adversarial challenge to secret 
intelligence that may draw on foreign events and the methods of foreign 
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  See, for example, F.L. Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court 
Party (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000).  
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intelligence agencies will be undercut if section 85.4(2) is interpreted to 
require a special advocate to function in splendid isolation once he or 
she has seen the secret information.  
Section 85.5 provides a somewhat better tailored restriction on what 
the special advocate can reveal. It provides: 
85.5 With the exception of communications authorized by a judge, 
no person shall 
(a)  disclose information or other evidence that is disclosed to 
them under section 85.4 and that is treated as confidential by 
the judge presiding at the proceeding; or 
(b)  communicate with another person about the content of any 
part of a proceeding under any of sections 78 and 82 to 82.2 
that is heard in the absence of the public and of the permanent 
resident or foreign national and their counsel. 
This provision seeks only to restrain the special advocate with respect to 
confidential information and information that is heard in the absence of 
the public and the affected party. Nevertheless, thought should be given 
to how a special advocate can obtain appropriate legal and factual 
assistance once the special advocate has been exposed to the secret 
information. It may be too much to assume that a single special advocate, 
or even two special advocates working together on a file,90 will be able 
on their own and without assistance to discharge the burden articulated 
in Charkaoui of providing effective adversarial challenge to the 
government’s case. The Court has underlined the importance of someone 
bringing to the attention of the reviewing judge all the relevant facts and 
laws. This process may in some cases require the special advocate to 
consult with others about the accuracy, reliability, relevance and 
significance of the secret information. In some cases, only the affected 
person may hold the clue to relevant facts that could rebut the secret 
evidence or at least place it in a fuller context. In other cases, the special 
advocate may need to consult experts on terrorism and geo-political 
events in order to put the intelligence into its full context. An 
intelligence report that may on first glance appear to be damming may 
appear significantly less so if the reliability of the underlying information 
is suspect or when reliable information is placed in its full context. 
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The special advocate will challenge both the government’s claim 
that information cannot be disclosed to the detainee and any secret 
evidence presented by the Minister to the reviewing judge. As discussed 
above, both of these challenges can serve important functions. A special 
advocate with experience in matters concerning national security 
confidentiality could effectively challenge overbroad claims of secrecy. 
At the same time, the government may still have the upper hand with 
respect to claims that the disclosure of information will harm relations to 
allies, secret informers or ongoing investigations. Even an experienced 
special advocate may be at a disadvantage in challenging the reliability 
of secret evidence or placing the secret evidence in context. The special 
advocate can interview the detainee before seeing the secret information. 
At that point in time, however, there is a danger that the special advocate 
will not ask the right questions. Although special advocates are skilled 
lawyers with experience with matters affecting national security 
confidentiality, they will not generally be experts about the countries in 
which detainees are alleged to have supported or engaged in terrorism. If 
after receiving the secret information, the special advocate wants to 
return and ask the detainee more questions, or even if the special 
advocate wants to ask a third-party expert for assistance, the special 
advocate must seek the permission of the judge. Without such assistance, 
the special advocate may be unable to present to the reviewing judge 
facts that are necessary to make an accurate determination of whether the 
detainee is a threat to the security of Canada. 
4. The Need for the Special Advocates to be Able to Make Ex Parte 
Representations under Section 85.2(c)  
The special advocate may be reluctant to seek permission to consult 
the detainee or others after having seen the secret information if such a 
process means that his or her work product will be revealed to the 
government. Under section 38.11(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, those 
opposing the Attorney General’s attempt to obtain non-disclosure orders 
can have ex parte hearings granted by the Federal Court judge. This 
process has the potential of allowing an accused to inform the judge of 
the accused’s line of defence without revealing such information to the 
Attorney General of Canada or those who are prosecuting the case. The 
Federal Court has repeatedly stressed the utility of this provision in 
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making the court aware of the affected person’s concerns.91 
Unfortunately, there is no such provision in Bill C-3 that would allow 
special advocates to seek permission from the presiding judge on an ex 
parte basis to consult the detainee, the detainee’s lawyers or other 
experts.92 The prospect of alerting the government to their lines of 
inquiry and their internal work product or simply their lack of 
knowledge about the political context of the intelligence may deter 
special advocates from seeking permission from the judge to obtain 
more information from the detainee and from experts.  
The government may argue that they must be informed so that they 
can make submissions with respect to the harms to national security and 
the risk of inadvertent disclosure. In many cases, however, the harms of 
disclosure to national security will be obvious and acknowledged by all 
parties. The presiding judges will already have heard and accepted 
adversarial argument from the government about the harm to national 
security or other persons that prevents the disclosure of the information 
to the detainee and his lawyer. It is difficult to see what the government 
can add with respect to the risk of inadvertent disclosure or to the best 
way for the special advocate to conduct him- or herself after seeing the 
secret information. The government was not able to make such 
adversarial arguments when counsel for SIRC or the Arar Commission 
asked questions of the affected persons after having seen the secret 
information. With respect to the risk of inadvertent disclosure of 
information, there may be no alternative to relying on the discretion and 
the integrity of security-cleared counsel in this area. In any event, the 
prospect of full notice to the government when special advocates seek 
judicial authorization under section 85.2(c) may inhibit special advocates 
from seeking additional powers.  
5. The Role of Special Advocates in Challenging the Reliability and 
Relevance of the Secret Evidence 
Under section 85.1(2) of Bill C-3, the special advocate can challenge 
“the relevance, reliability and sufficiency” of the information provided 
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by the Minister. The reference to challenging the relevance of the 
information is particularly interesting. It opens up the possibility that the 
special advocate can argue that intelligence about a person’s associations 
— indeed the very type of information that was at the heart of the Arar 
matter — is of limited or no relevance. It follows from a recommendation 
that was made by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association93 to 
the committees conducting the three-year review, but one that was 
rejected by the committees. Intelligence may be based on assumptions 
and presumptions of guilt that would be rejected under more disciplined 
evidentiary thinking requiring that the probative value of evidence be 
identified, that irrelevant evidence be excluded and that the prejudicial 
effect of evidence be balanced against its probative value.94 The practical 
meaning of the reference to challenging the relevance of secret evidence 
may, however, be undercut by section 83(h) which provides: 
(h) the judge may receive into evidence anything that, in the judge’s 
opinion, is reliable and appropriate, even if it is inadmissible in a court 
of law, and may base a decision on that evidence.  
(Emphasis added) 
In other words, the special advocate is mandated to make submissions 
about the relevance of the information, but the judge is only mandated to 
determine whether the evidence is “reliable and appropriate”. Section 
83(j), however, contemplates that the judge shall return irrelevant material 
to the Minister by providing: 
(j) the judge shall not base a decision on information or other evidence 
provided by the Minister, and shall return it to the Minister, if the judge 
determines that it is not relevant or if the Minister withdraws it. 
It remains to be seen whether these changes will move security certificates 
away from an intelligence-based paradigm to a more evidence-based 
paradigm. On an evidence-based paradigm, a reviewing judge could 
conclude that intelligence revealing that a detainee has strong and perhaps 
extreme religious or political views and associations with extremists may 
be of questionable relevance to the ultimate issue of whether the detainee 
is a threat to national security. There is, however, no guarantee that the 
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reviewing judges will take this approach and they could define relevance 
in a broad manner and rarely, if ever, send information back to the 
government on the ground that it was irrelevant. The specially 
designated judges of the Federal Court who review security certificates 
have experience with seeing secret intelligence and it remains to be seen 
how this experience will affect their determinations of relevance. That 
said, section 83(j) is a new and mandatory provision that should be given 
a generous and purposive interpretation. It seems intended to discipline 
the type of information that is used to support security certificates and to 
ensure that irrelevant but prejudicial intelligence about the detainees is 
not considered by the reviewing judge and is returned to the Minister.  
6. The Role of the Special Advocate in Challenging Secret Evidence 
Obtained as a Result of Torture or Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment 
Bill C-3 to its credit enters into the torture debate by providing in 
section 83(1.1) that “reliable and appropriate evidence does not include 
information that is believed on reasonable grounds to have been obtained 
as a result of the use of torture within the meaning of section 269.1 of 
the Criminal Code, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment within the meaning of the Convention Against Torture”. 
Parliament has chosen a fairly broad prohibition on evidence derived 
from torture that does not on its face contemplate an exception for 
derivative evidence that is obtained from an independent source. 
In addition to statements and derivative evidence obtained from 
torture, section 83(1.1) also prohibits the use of statements and derivative 
evidence obtained as a result of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment 
or punishment. These conditions can include detention without basic 
amenities, prolonged isolation, restraints in very painful conditions, 
sleep deprivation for prolonged periods, threats and exposure to loud 
music for prolonged periods.95 This provision will give both the detainees’ 
lawyers and special advocates resources to challenge much intelligence 
received from countries with poor human rights records as well as some 
intelligence received from American agencies.96 This provision takes a 
strong and appropriate legislative stand against evidence obtained as a 
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result of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. It raises 
questions about the viability of cases against detainees that may rely on 
intelligence supplied by countries prepared to use harsh interrogation 
techniques and impose harsh conditions of confinement.  
The provisions which allow special advocates to challenge secret 
intelligence on the basis that it is irrelevant, unreliable or obtained as a 
result of torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment have a potential 
to put the whole process of intelligence gathering on trial. Depending on 
the receptivity of the judges to such claims, these provisions may have 
far-reaching and perhaps unintended effects. They could be as important 
to the security certificate regime as the exclusion of improperly obtained 
evidence is to the criminal justice system. If the reviewing judges are 
willing to exclude a significant portion of the secret intelligence that is 
presented to them because of concerns about its relevance and reliability, 
these evidentiary challenges could shake the sustainability of security 
certificates, apart from other challenges based on indeterminate detention 
and deportation to torture which will be examined in the third part of this 
essay. 
7. The Equal Treatment of Permanent Residents and other Non-
Citizens: Dialogue or Obedience? 
Bill C-3 followed the Supreme Court’s Charkaoui decision by 
providing that non-citizens who do not have permanent resident status 
should have the same right to prompt initial judicial review of detention 
as permanent residents. In other words both permanent residents and 
foreign nationals have a right to judicial review of their initial detention 
within 48 hours of the detention.97 Some would argue that such a 
response should not be characterized as dialogue between Parliament 
and the Court but rather as the obedience of Parliament to the Court.98 
There are, however, some instances when there is simply not a wide 
range of policy choices. This part of the legislative reply codifies the 
Court’s immediate remedy in Charkaoui and is justified because the 
Supreme Court found the distinction between the treatment of permanent 
residents and other non-citizens for the purpose of reviewing detention 
was arbitrary and could not be justified in relation to any specific 
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governmental purpose. If the government had a legitimate purpose for 
such a distinction and could justify differential treatment of permanent 
residents and other non-citizens for the purposes of the initial review of 
their detention, it could have enacted and defended a differential regime. 
Even when legislatures appear to follow the dictates of Court 
decisions, however, they retain the ability to place subtle yet sometimes 
important qualifications into the new legislation. For example, Parliament’s 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Duarte99 that judicial 
warrants were required when a person “wears a wire” by engaging in 
electronic surveillance of another person included not only the provision 
of new warrants, but also explicit legislative authorization for the use of 
warrantless wires in some limited circumstances.100 Bill C-3 follows this 
trend of following the gist of the Court’s decision while introducing a 
subtle yet potentially important difference in the new legislation. Bill  
C-3 provides for judicial review of detention under security certificates 
every six months, yet effectively extends the period between such 
judicial reviews by calculating the six-month period as only starting after 
the completion of the previous judicial review.101 Depending on the time 
that the parties and the judge spends on conducting and completing the 
review, the result could be a significant extension of the periods between 
judicial review.102 The merits of this change are not clear, but the 
institutional point is that even when the legislature may appear to obey a 
court decision, it retains the ability to introduce potentially significant 
variations in new legislation.  
8. Recognition of House Arrest as an Alternative to Detention 
Although Bill C-3 can be characterized as a truncated form of 
dialogue because it only provides special advocates for security 
certificate proceedings and because it delegates the toughest issues 
concerning the role of special advocates to the reviewing judge, it 
expands the policy debate about security certificates in some respects. 
For example, it builds on the practice of Federal Court judges granting 
those subject to long-term detention under security certificates conditional 
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release. It does so by providing for arrest powers if the conditions of 
release are breached103 and by providing for six-month judicial reviews 
of the conditions of release.104 The practice of release under conditions 
was encouraged by the Supreme Court in Charkaoui which interpreted 
the relevant schemes “as enabling the judge to consider whether any 
danger attendant on release can be mitigated by conditions”.105 The Court 
also provided a general list of factors that the judge should consider 
including the reasons for detention, length of detention, reasons for the 
delay in deportation and anticipated future length of detention. In Bill  
C-3, Parliament was content to leave these matters, as well as the range 
of conditions that can be placed on security certificate detainees, to 
judicial discretion even though in other contexts including bail, the 
legislature provides judges with more guidance.  
Section 82(5) requires that a person be detained if their release under 
conditions would harm national security, endanger the safety of any 
person or if they would be likely to abscond.106 The same section is, 
however, silent on the criteria to be used to determine the conditions of 
release.107 The conditions of house arrest imposed on the security 
certificate detainees has not surprisingly attracted a tremendous amount of 
litigation, and some of the conditions are quite harsh. For example, Mr. 
Harkat is subject to house arrest with only limited trips allowed outside 
the house and with all places and visits being vetted by the Canadian 
Border Services Agency.108 He has been found in breach of some 
conditions.109 The British legislation that responds to the House of Lords’ 
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Belmarsh decision provided more guidance regarding the content of 
control orders.110 That said, the British legislation has not prevented 
extensive litigation over the content of the control orders.111 The 
conditions imposed on security certificate detainees may, like bail 
conditions, inevitably be a topic for frequent judicial review. 
9. Recognition of Limited Appeals 
Bill C-3 also provides for a limited appeal from a judge’s 
determination that a security certificate is reasonable or from a detention 
review. The right of appeal is limited to a question that the presiding 
judge certifies as “a serious question of general importance”.112 This 
process is much more limited than granting a full right of appeal. This 
provision cannot be characterized as a dialogic response to the Court’s 
ruling because the Court in Charkaoui113 rejected the argument that the 
Charter and the rule of law require an appeal. Nevertheless, the provision 
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reveals how Parliament retains the ability to deny and shape appeal 
rights. Indeed, the provision harkens back to pre-Charter traditions when 
Parliament reformed appeals from jury acquittals and capital punishment 
even in the face of Court decisions that the existing provisions did not 
violate the Canadian Bill of Rights. 
10. Release to Permit Departure from Canada 
The Supreme Court in Charkaoui considered the possibility of 
release of a detainee to allow their departure from Canada, but was not 
optimistic that this constituted a realistic remedy in these cases. The 
Court stated: 
The Federal Court suggested that Mr. Almrei “holds the key to his 
release”: Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
[2004] 4 F.C.R. 327, 2004 FC 420, at para. 138. But voluntary 
departure may be impossible. A person named in a certificate of 
inadmissibility may have nowhere to go. Other countries may assume 
such a person to be a terrorist and are likely to refuse entry, or the 
person may fear torture on his or her return. Deportation may fail for 
the same reasons, despite the observation that “[i]n our jurisdiction, at 
this moment, deportation to torture remains a possibility” in exceptional 
circumstances: Almrei, 2005 FCA 54, at para. 127. The only realistic 
option may be judicial release.114 
Despite these comments, Bill C-3 allows the Minister to authorize the 
release of a detainee to permit their departure from Canada.115 It is 
possible that this provision could be used in situations where the 
detainee cannot be returned to their country of origin because of 
concerns that they will be tortured, but where some third country agrees 
to accept the person. This provision demonstrates Parliament’s ability to 
pursue policy options even in the face of skepticism from the Court 
about whether they are viable. 
11. Summary 
Bill C-3 responded to the specific flaws in security certificates that 
were found to exist in Charkaoui. Parliament has taken the narrow 
lesson of Charkaoui seriously and provided for adversarial challenge to 
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the secret intelligence used to support security certificates. In doing so, 
Parliament has opted for the one example of adversarial challenge to 
secret information — the special advocate system — that the Supreme 
Court in Charkaoui recognized had been criticized. Parliament has opted 
for a special advocate system that attempts to limit the risk of inadvertent 
disclosure of secret information by requiring judicial permission and 
supervision of the ability of the special advocate to contact others after 
having seen the secret information as opposed to a system that follows 
the SIRC or Arar Commission model and relies on the integrity and 
ingenuity of security cleared counsel in ensuring that secrets are not 
inadvertently disclosed when they discuss matters with the affected party 
and their counsel. Parliament also chose not to follow the model of 
section 38 of the CEA that would allow judges to balance the harms of 
disclosure of secret information against the harms caused to the affected 
person by non-disclosure. Parliament has responded to Charkaoui, but in 
a manner that maximizes its policy interests in secrecy while at the same 
time still allowing some adversarial challenge to the secret information. 
Finally, Parliament has deferred many of the important procedural 
details about how the special advocate system will operate to the 
decisions of the Federal Court judges who preside at security certificate 
hearings. 
Bill C-3 slightly expands the policy debate because it goes beyond 
the narrow issue of adversarial challenge and addresses some other 
important issues including prohibiting evidence obtained by torture and 
other forms of cruel and degrading treatment and allowing the reviewing 
judge to send irrelevant information back to the Minister. These provisions 
have the potential to result in the exclusion of secret information that 
could have been accepted and used by the reviewing judges before the 
enactment of Bill C-3. Bill C-3 implicitly recognizes the practice of 
releasing security certificate detainees under strict house arrest 
conditions, and it allows some limited appeals.116 Although Bill C-3 goes 
somewhat beyond a response to Charkaoui, it leaves unanswered many 
important issues about both security certificates and the treatment of 
secret information.  
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IV. THE TRUNCATED DIALOGIC RESPONSE OF BILL C-3 
Bill C-3 will not end the dialogue between courts and legislatures 
about either security certificates or the treatment of secret information. 
To some extent, it may be inevitable that there are many outstanding 
issues still to be resolved. The treatment of those who cannot be 
deported because of concerns that they will be tortured and the treatment 
of secret evidence that cannot be disclosed are two of the most difficult 
issues that arise in anti-terrorism law and policy.117 There are no easy 
answers. That said, however, both the Court and Parliament could have 
decided more in this episode of dialogue. As suggested above, the Court 
avoided grappling with the equality implications of security certificates 
and the questions that a section 1 analysis would have raised about the 
rationality and proportionality of using immigration law as anti-terrorism 
law. It also deferred and finessed the issue of when indeterminate 
detention will become unconstitutional, the issue of deportation to 
torture and the degree of connection that should be required between 
detention and a realistic prospect of deportation. 
As will be seen, Parliament took its lead from the Court’s silence on 
the larger issues of indeterminate detention, torture and the treatment of 
secret information. Parliament’s silence on these critical issues is 
consistent with a model of dialogue in which judicial decisions are often 
necessary to force legislatures to consider the rights of the unpopular. 
The Court’s minimalist decision in Charkaoui did not force Parliament 
to deal with these larger issues. In Bill C-3, Parliament was more than 
happy to avoid them.118 Parliament also ignored clear recommendations 
by both Parliamentary committees that special advocates be used 
whenever the government presents secret information on an ex parte 
basis. Finally, Parliament did not appear to turn its mind to the long-term 
sustainability of security certificates or the related issue of how Canada’s 
treatment of secret information can be reformed in order to ensure that 
criminal prosecutions are a viable alternative should immigration law 
security certificates prove not to be sustainable. 
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It could be argued with some justification that it is unrealistic to 
expect Parliament to deal with all the difficult issues related to security 
certificates and secrecy in one go. Still, there are examples of Parliament 
taking a broader response to the task of responding to Charter decisions 
about the requirements of adjudicative fairness and section 7 of the 
Charter. A good example of Parliament’s unique ability to broaden the 
policy debate when crafting a reply to a Charter decision by the courts is 
Parliament’s multi-faceted response to the Court’s decision in R. v. 
Seaboyer119 that the so-called “rape shield” law restricting the 
admissibility of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct was an unjustified 
violation of the section 7 rights of the accused. The Court’s decision was 
controversial and unpopular. Indeed, there was some initial interest in 
using the section 33 override to restore the evidentiary rule that the 
Court had struck down with immediate effect. Nevertheless, the 
Department of Justice consulted widely on the issue including with 
women’s groups and rape crisis centres and was eventually persuaded to 
take a broader approach that would define consent for the purposes of 
sexual assault law — the widely known “no means no” provisions. 
Parliament also changed the fault level for sexual assault, replacing the 
controversial defence of honest but unreasonable mistaken belief in 
consent with a new requirement that the accused take reasonable steps in 
the circumstances known to him to ascertain consent. Only after making 
these two fundamental changes to the law of sexual assault, changes that 
were not required to respond to the Court’s narrow ruling in Seaboyer, 
did Parliament also respond to the narrow ruling in Seaboyer by enacting 
new and more flexible restrictions on the admissibility of evidence of the 
complainant’s prior sexual conduct. Even then, Parliament broadened 
the debate by extending the restrictions to any prior sexual contact that 
the complainant may have had with the accused. This episode of 
dialogue demonstrates the ability of Parliament to change the rules of the 
game when devising responses to the Court’s Charter decisions.  
A similarly robust response to Charkaoui might have attempted to 
change the rules of the game by providing for special advocates 
whenever the government relies upon secret evidence and changing the 
rules that are used to define and assert governmental interests in secrecy. 
A robust response might also have anticipated further Charter challenges 
to the security certificate regime with respect to indeterminate detention 
and the deportation to torture issues, even though these issues were not 
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decided by the Court in Charkaoui. As will be seen, Parliament decided 
not to expand the policy debate about secrecy and security certificates in 
this manner. It could be argued that the Court’s 12-month suspended 
declaration of invalidity did not give the government enough time to 
devise such a broad response to Charkaoui. Nevertheless, Parliament’s 
broad and seemingly successful response to Seaboyer was crafted in just 
over a year. One difference may be that the government’s response to 
Seaboyer was only devised after broad consultation that allowed the 
people on the ground to inform the government about practical issues 
that were arising in sexual assault cases and that needed to be resolved.120 
In contrast, Bill C-3 did not seem to have been preceded by widespread 
consultation with those who worked on the security certificate cases and 
other cases involving governmental claims of secrecy. The Seaboyer 
saga suggests that more democracy and consultation in devising replies 
to Charter decisions may enrich the nature of the legislative reply. 
1. Special Advocates in Other Proceedings 
Both parliamentary committees that conducted the three-year review 
of anti-terrorism legislation recommended that special advocates should 
have a role to play under not only the security certificate provisions of 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, but also the national 
security confidentiality provisions of the Canada Evidence Act and the 
provisions for the listing of terrorist groups and the de-registering of 
charities because of alleged involvement in terrorism. The government 
decided not to follow this approach and Bill C-3 only provides for 
special advocates for security certificate proceedings under the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act. Parliament has the capacity to take a broader 
approach to policy issues such as challenges to secret information, but it 
can also take a narrower approach if it simply responds to specific Court 
decisions. 
Parliament’s failure to provide for a broader role for special advocates 
does not, however, mean that security cleared lawyers will not be 
appointed in other proceedings. Indeed, security cleared lawyers have 
already been appointed to assist with section 38 proceedings both in 
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relation to extradition proceedings121 and a criminal terrorism trial.122 
Nevertheless, the availability of special advocates will be litigated on a 
case-by-case basis. Indeed, there may be differences within the Federal 
Court on these matters: in his decision in Khawaja, Chief Justice Lutfy 
indicated that special advocates might have to be available to uphold 
section 38 against constitutional challenge,123 whereas the Federal Court 
of Appeal did not address this possibility, with one judge hinting that 
section 38 would prohibit disclosure of the information to anyone, 
possibly including a security cleared lawyer.124 Litigation over such 
issues would not be necessary had Parliament clearly indicated in Bill  
C-3 that special advocates would be available in all proceedings where 
the government was able to make ex parte representations about secret 
information.  
Another consequence of only including special advocates in 
immigration matters under Bill C-3 is that its provisions restricting the 
communications of special advocates after they have seen the secret 
information will not apply when special advocates are appointed in other 
proceedings. Justice Mosley has fashioned conditions on the appointment 
of a security cleared lawyer that are similar to Bill C-3 in the Khadr125 
case. But this remains a matter of judicial discretion. To the extent that 
the restrictions that are placed on special advocates under Bill C-3 are 
overbroad or may result in a violation of section 7, however, the fact that 
judges are not bound by Bill C-3 when appointing special advocates in 
other proceedings may produce some beneficial flexibility, albeit not 
flexibility that was intended by Parliament.  
2. Deportation to Torture and the Sustainability of Security 
Certificates 
The Supreme Court asserted at the start of its Charkaoui judgment 
that the issue of deportation to torture did not arise on the three cases it 
had before it.126 The Court also refused to hold that the long-term 
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detention of the three applicants violated sections 7 and 12 of the 
Charter. It distinguished the situation in the House of Lords’ Belmarsh 
case on the basis that the Canadian regime did not authorize indeterminate 
detention, but only long-term detention pending deportation.127 The issue 
of whether detention is pending deportation will inevitably raise the 
issue of whether there is a realistic possibility of deportation. In turn, 
when deportation would result in suspected terrorists being returned to 
countries such as Egypt and Syria, the issue of whether there is a 
realistic possibility of deportation will depend on whether the Suresh 
exception that contemplates deportation to a substantial risk of torture 
will be employed. Although the Suresh exception may not have been 
raised squarely on the records of the cases heard in Charkaoui, it hangs 
over all the security certificate cases. Nothing would have stopped 
Parliament from grappling with the torture issue that was avoided by the 
Court. A clear rejection of the Suresh exception would have responded 
to international criticisms and have been consistent with the prohibition 
in Bill C-3 on the use of secret evidence obtained from torture. It also 
would have made clear the need for alternatives to deportation in the 
security certificate cases. 
Justice Mackay has rejected the government’s attempt to invoke the 
Suresh exception to allow the deportation of Mr. Jaballah given the 
findings that he faced a “serious risk that he would face torture, death or 
inhumane treatment” if he was deported to Egypt.128 Justice Mackay 
recognized that the Suresh exception was anomalous and interpreted it 
narrowly, ruling: 
Suresh, thus far, has led to debate, whether it is within the 
discretion of the MCI to deport an inadmissible person to a country 
where there is a serious risk of torture. Mr. Justice Dennis O’Connor, 
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as Commissioner, in his Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar, 
Analysis and Recommendations, (2006) (Vol. 3) Part II pp. 51-52, 
wrote of the right to be free from torture as an absolute right. In his 
view, “The infliction of torture, for any purpose, is so fundamental a 
violation of human dignity, that it can never be legally justified.” He 
makes reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to 
several international agreements, including the Convention against 
Torture, to which Canada is a party, and to the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms as well as the Criminal Code of Canada, all of 
which confirm the absolute rejection of torture. Article 3 of the 
Convention Against Torture prohibits a state party from expelling, 
returning or extraditing a person to another state where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture. 
That prohibition is now widely recognized and accepted in many 
countries of the world, including those within the European Union. It is 
reflected in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh. 
That judgment’s reference to exceptional cases left open for future 
consideration cannot have been intended to leave many cases to be 
classed as exceptional. Rather, the general principle, as I read Suresh, 
is that deportation to a country where there is a substantial risk of 
torture would infringe an individual’s rights, in this case Mr. Jaballah’s 
rights, under s. 7 of the Charter, and, in my view, infringement 
generally would require that the exceptional case would have to be 
justified under s. 1. 
Here, no case has been argued that Mr. Jaballah’s circumstances 
are exceptional, or that they could be so qualified under s.1 of the 
Charter. I have found the Ministers’ certified opinion to be reasonable. 
By inference that opinion signifies that his continuing presence in 
Canada, without restraints, would constitute a danger to the security of 
the country. Yet there is no case argued that he has been personally 
involved in violence. 
I conclude that the facts of this case do not create an exceptional 
circumstance that would warrant Mr. Jaballah’s deportation to face 
torture abroad.129 
If it is accepted that this decision is good law, and in my view it should 
be,130 then it is unlikely that the Suresh exception will be used in any of 
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the remaining security certificate cases. It would be especially odd to do 
so when Bill C-3 itself repudiates evidence obtained as a result of 
torture, as well as degrading, cruel and unusual treatment. If Canada 
rightly does not want to have blood on its hands with evidence obtained 
as a result of torture, it surely would not want to deport a person to a 
substantial risk of torture. 
Parliament had available to it some sound advice on how the issue of 
deportation to torture lies at the heart of our present security certificate 
cases. The Senate Committee that conducted the three-year review of our 
anti-terrorism legislation noted a few days before the Supreme Court 
delivered its judgment in Charkaoui that both the United Nations 
Committee Against Torture and the Human Rights Committee had called 
on Canada to reaffirm its commitment to the absolute right against 
torture despite the controversial statement in Suresh v. Canada that in 
some “exceptional circumstances” deportation to torture might be 
consistent with the Canadian Charter (though not with international law). 
The Senate Committee recommended that the immigration law be 
amended to repeal the Suresh exception that would allow deportation to 
the substantial risk of torture.131 At the same time, the Senate Committee 
was not naïve about the dilemmas posed by suspected terrorists who 
cannot be deported to home countries with poor human rights records. It 
recommended work on ensuring the effectiveness of assurances that a 
person would not be tortured. It also recommended that Canada show 
leadership at the United Nations in resolving the dilemmas created by 
suspected terrorists who may be subject to indeterminate detention and 
control in circumstances where they cannot be deported to their country 
of citizenship because they will be tortured. Canada is not alone in 
grappling with the difficulties of how to treat terrorist suspects who 
cannot be deported because of concerns that they will face torture if 
returned to their country of citizenship. 
Parliament in Bill C-3 ignored the conundrum of deporting non-
citizens suspected of terrorism to torture or subjecting them to indeterminate 
detention in Canada. On the one hand, Canada should honour its 
international commitments against being involved with torture. On the 
other hand, refusal to deport such persons could result in indeterminate 
detention that may eventually be held to violate sections 7 and 12 of the 
Charter. It is perhaps understandable that Parliament did not rush in to 
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solve this thorny dilemma. The release of most of the security certificate 
detainees under very restrictive house arrest conditions is the present 
solution, but it is unlikely to be a satisfactory or permanent one. The 
detainees will continue to exercise their Charter rights to challenge the 
very tight restrictions placed on them. The Supreme Court in Charkaoui 
has made clear that the detainees have Charter rights to such regular 
reviews and it has not precluded the possibility that a court might in the 
future hold that continued restrictions on liberty will violate the Charter. 
Bill C-3 only postpones the day of reckoning when courts will have to 
decide whether to deport these detainees despite the risk of torture or 
release them because their indeterminate detention under immigration 
law without realistic prospect of deportation violates their rights under 
the Charter. 
If one accepts the government’s position that the detainees are a 
danger to national security with connections to international terrorist 
groups, then the ultimate response to the security certificate cases may 
be to attempt to bring criminal prosecutions against the detainees. These 
prosecutions could possibly relate to actions before their detention, 
though in most cases charges under the Anti-terrorism Act would not be 
possible because those offences could not be charged in relation to 
events that occurred before December of 2001. Conversely, if the 
detainees are really terrorists, it could be expected that after release they 
might engage in activities that could lead to charges under the Anti-
terrorism Act or other criminal charges. One of the obstacles to using the 
criminal law as a means to incapacitate and punish terrorists, however, is 
the recently documented tendency of the Government of Canada to make 
overbroad claims of secrecy. Such claims not only limit the type of 
evidence that can be used in criminal prosecutions where secret evidence 
is not accepted, but they also cause extensive litigation under section 38 
of the Canada Evidence Act in order to obtain non-disclosure orders. 
Such orders are not costless because the trial judge retains the ultimate 
ability to decide whether a fair trial is possible in light of the non-
disclosure orders.132  
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3. The Problems Presented by Overclaiming of Secrecy 
The use of security certificates against suspected terrorists in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11 allowed Canadian officials to use secret 
evidence, including intelligence provided by our allies, without risking 
disclosure. As a result of the Court’s decision in Charkaoui, it will 
become more difficult to rely on such secret evidence. Special advocates 
under Bill C-3 will be able to see the secret information. They will be 
able to argue that the secret evidence presented by the government 
should be ignored by the reviewing judge because it is irrelevant or 
obtained as a result of torture or degrading or inhumane treatment. 
Special advocates will also be able to challenge the government’s claims 
that the information must be kept secret to prevent harms to national 
security or other persons. Given the experience with overclaiming to be 
examined below, there is reason to believe that special advocates will 
enjoy some success in resisting governmental claims of secrecy. Indeed, 
the government may have recognized that it had engaged in overclaiming 
in the security certificate cases: it declassified a good deal of material 
when it recommenced security certificate proceedings after Bill C-3 had 
been proclaimed in force.133 This may have been a pre-emptive move to 
minimize the chances that special advocates could succeed in arguing 
that the release of some of the previously secret material would not harm 
national security or any person. The new special advocate regime may 
have scored a significant victory for more disclosure even before it 
became operational. 
4. The Arar Commission and the Problems of Overclaiming 
Secrecy  
The Arar Commission experience provides a number of lessons 
about the dangers of excessive claims of secrecy by the government. The 
Arar Commission recognized from the outset its duty to protect secrets. 
Its terms of reference instructed it not to release information “if in the 
opinion of the Commissioner, the disclosure of that information would 
be injurious to international relations, national defence or national security”. 
The Commission repeatedly stressed the importance of respecting 
caveats or restrictions on the use of information according to the third 
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party rule. It also recognized that there were many types of injurious 
information including “confidential sources of information (informers) 
and details of ongoing national security investigations”.134 In recognition 
of its national security confidentiality (“NSC”) obligations, the Commission 
also agreed to conduct much of its hearings in camera, but with the 
expectation that periodic summaries of the information would be 
prepared to inform the public and the excluded parties as much as 
possible about what was happening behind closed doors. 
Despite its awareness of NSC concerns, the Arar Commission and 
the government came into conflict over the release of a summary of 
evidence concerning the involvement of CSIS. Justice O’Connor 
proposed a summary of about seven pages that he concluded could be 
released without causing injury, whereas the government proposed a 
summary of about three pages that it believed could be disclosed. 
Moreover, the government indicated that it would initiate proceedings 
under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act if the Commission released 
its more extensive summary.135 In order to avoid what it concluded 
would be protracted and repeated litigation under section 38 that would 
delay the inquiry, the Commission abandoned its attempts to produce 
summaries. Instead, the commission continued its in camera hearings 
until April 2005. In the end, the Commission had 75 days of in camera 
hearings and 45 days of public hearings.  
In his report, O’Connor J. noted that the government had abandoned 
some of its previous NSC claims, particularly in relation to the 
inflammatory and inaccurate request by the RCMP for border lookouts 
that described Maher Arar and Monia Mazigh as Islamic extremists with 
connections to Al Qaeda and in relation to the RCMP sending questions 
for Syrian Military intelligence to ask Mr. Almalki. Although he noted 
that it may have been understandable for the government to err on the 
side of caution, O’Connor J. was critical of the government’s approach 
to NSC claims. He commented that:  
… overclaiming exacerbates the transparency and procedural fairness 
that inevitably accompany any proceeding that cannot be fully open 
because of NSC concerns. It also promotes public suspicion and 
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cynicism about legitimate claims by the Government of national 
security confidentiality. … I am raising the issue of the Government’s 
overly broad NSC claims in the hope that the experience in this inquiry 
may provide some guidance for other proceedings. In legal and 
administrative proceedings where the Government makes NSC claims 
over some information, the single most important factor in trying to 
ensure public accountability and fairness is for the Government to limit 
from the outset, the breadth of those claims to what is truly necessary. 
Litigating questionable NSC claims is in nobody’s interest. Although 
government agencies may be tempted to make NSC claims to shield 
certain information from public scrutiny and avoid potential 
embarrassment, that temptation should always be resisted.136 
These comments reflected the particular experience of the Arar inquiry, 
but they also produce questions about whether the government has 
engaged in similar overclaiming in security certificate proceedings. They 
also foreshadowed some of the Supreme Court’s concerns about security 
certificates in Charkaoui by indicating the inverse relation between the 
breadth of secrecy claims and the fairness of proceedings. As the 
Supreme Court would subsequently note, secrecy in security certificate 
hearings prevents the detainee from fully defending himself. They even 
preclude the judge from asking critical questions of the detainee for fear 
of revealing secrets.137 
Despite the reduction of the government’s NSC claims during the 
course of the Arar inquiry, the commission and the government could 
not agree on the release of certain portions of the report. Although there 
was agreement between the government and the commission about the 
release of 99.5 per cent of the report, a quantitative approach would be 
misleading. The Commission’s report was long, comprising three volumes, 
in large part because so much of the hearings were heard in camera. The 
release of the majority of the disputed 1,500 words as authorized by the 
Federal Court under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act revealed 
                                                                                                             
136
  Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, 
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations, supra, note 134, at 
302, 304. 
137  Charkaoui, supra, note 105, at para. 64: 
… the judge’s activity on behalf of the named person is confined to what is presented by 
the ministers. The judge is therefore not in a position to compensate for the lack of 
informed scrutiny, challenge and counter-evidence that a person familiar with the case 
could bring. Such scrutiny is the whole point of the principle that a person whose liberty 
is in jeopardy must know the case to meet. Here that principle has not merely been 
limited; it has been effectively gutted. How can one meet a case one does not know? 
340 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
some matters that certainly caught public attention, even if the initial 
non-disclosure of these matters did not prevent the commission from 
discharging its mandate of investigating the actions of Canadian officials 
in relation to Mr. Arar.  
In reaching a conclusion that parts of the disputed passages could be 
released, Noël J. indicated that some of the information redacted from 
the Arar Commission report if released would not injure national security, 
national defence or international relations.138 This is an extraordinary 
finding given the deference that is generally paid to the government on 
the existence of injury139 and the breadth of state interests protected 
under the rubric of national security, national defence and international 
relations. Such a finding of no harm to national security would have led 
to the release of secret information in security certificate proceedings 
even though in such proceedings, unlike under section 38 of the Canada 
Evidence Act, the judge has no discretion to balance the competing 
public interests in disclosure and non-disclosure. 
The release of the majority of the information from the public Arar 
Commission report that the government had challenged under section 38 
of the CEA has added more fuel to concerns about government 
overclaiming of NSC. Some of the new information that was ordered 
released by the Federal Court simply related to the fact that the RCMP 
had contacts with the FBI and the CIA. In one case, the government’s 
redactions were lifted on references to the RCMP and CSIS.140 In other 
cases, the redactions applied to a suspicion held by a senior CSIS official 
that the Americans wanted to have Arar removed to Jordan where “they 
can have their way with him”.141 The precise nature of the government’s 
NSC claim in relation to this statement is not outlined in the public 
judgment in the matter, but likely relates to claims that such observations 
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might damage our relations with the CIA. Although such claims could 
perhaps be squeezed into the broad confines of Canada’s national 
security or international relations interests, they also suggest concerns 
about a disclosure that might be embarrassing to Canadian and American 
agencies.  
Another portion of the Arar report that was authorized for release 
related to findings that the RCMP used information obtained from Mr. 
El Maati in Syria without mention of the possibility of torture or that the 
DFAIT’s observations about him being observed in good condition were 
made nine months after his alleged confession.142 Although the exact 
nature of the government’s NSC argument is not disclosed in the public 
judgment, the relation to national security or international relation 
interests seem tenuous, especially compared to the public interest in 
disclosure of such practices. Finally, it should be emphasized that the 
government’s decision to oppose the release of the above information 
was not lightly made. Justice Noël has stated that it was made in a 
process that involved several deputy ministers and the briefing of the 
responsible Ministers.143  
5. Other Cases of Overclaiming Secrecy 
Justice Noël’s conclusions in the Arar Commission case should also 
be combined with Mosley J.’s statement in his first section 38 decision 
in Khawaja144 that “those holding the black pens seem to have assumed 
that each reference to CSIS must be redacted from the documents even 
when there is no apparent risk of disclosure of sensitive information such 
as operational methods or investigative techniques or the identity of their 
employees” and his statement in his second section 38 decision in the 
same case that he would have been inclined to find no injury to national 
security with respect to the information that the government had claimed 
secrecy. In that case, Mosley J. remarked that “there tends to be an 
excessive redaction of innocuous information in these cases”.145 
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These three decisions by specially designated judges of the Federal 
Court with extensive experience with national security matters provide 
independent confirmation of O’Connor J.’s observations that not all is 
right with respect to the government’s secrecy claims. It is troubling that 
the government has continued to overclaim national security 
confidentiality after O’Connor J.’s criticisms of their position at the Arar 
Commission. In both the Khawaja and the Arar Commission cases, the 
government has claimed NSC over some material that judges of the 
Federal Court have determined would not cause injury to national 
security, national defence or international relations. These findings raise 
serious questions about whether there has been similar overclaiming in 
the security certificate cases.  
The reasons why the government might overclaim NSC are 
speculative and will probably never be known, given that the process 
itself is protected by both NSC and attorney-client privilege. It is likely 
affected by a number of factors including the fact that the Attorney 
General of Canada represents all the various agencies that may want to 
assert NSC claims, limits on resources and capacity in the redaction 
process, and concerns that Canada’s oft-noted position as a net importer 
of intelligence makes it particularly vulnerable to concerns, legitimate or 
not, that allies might have about disclosure of information that they have 
shared with Canada. Indeed, the government argued in the section 38 
proceedings in relation to the Arar Commission that the mere fact of 
asking other countries to consider amending caveats or restrictions on 
the use of information could cause damage to information sharing with 
allies.146 This position is contrary to that taken by the Arar Commission 
which stressed the importance of caveats, but also made clear that it was 
perfectly acceptable to request an originating agency to make changes to 
caveats. Indeed, the passage of time may make it possible for caveats to 
be amended to allow the disclosure of material that would no longer 
reveal ongoing investigations or vulnerable sources. 
There are aspects of Bill C-3 that speak to a culture in Ottawa that 
places a premium on secrecy and is very anxious about the risk of 
inadvertent disclosure of secret information. As discussed above, section 
85.4(2) contains a stunningly broad provision that essentially prohibits a 
special advocate from communicating “with another person about the 
proceeding” without judicial authorization after the special advocate has 
seen the secret information. This provision exists despite the fact that the 
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special advocate has received a security clearance and is a person 
permanently bound to secrecy under the Security of Information Act.147 
Likewise, section 83(1.2)(c) requires a judge to deny the detainee’s 
request for a specific special advocate in cases where the special 
advocate already has had access to secret information the disclosure of 
which would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of a 
person if “there is a risk of inadvertent disclosure of that information or 
other evidence”. This provision seems to require a zero risk of 
inadvertent disclosure of information. It discounts the records of SIRC 
and Commission counsel in handling secret information in a careful 
manner.148  
6. Has There Been Overclaiming in Security Certificate Cases?  
The above cases raise concerns that there has been overclaiming of 
secrecy in security certificate cases. Concerns about overclaiming are in 
some respects even more pressing in the security certificate context. 
Under section 78 of the IRPA, the specially designated judge is not 
allowed to disclose any evidence that he or she concludes would be 
injurious to national security or the safety of any person. Unlike under 
section 38.06 of the Canada Evidence Act, the judge is not given the 
power to balance and weigh the degree of injury against the public 
interest in disclosure. At the same time, section 78 of the IRPA does not 
include the broad concepts of injury to national defence and international 
relations found in section 38 of the CEA. This is probably a neglected 
advantage of the IRPA over the CEA. 
The government’s decision to make public much more information 
when it refiled the security certificates after the proclamation of Bill C-3 
is consistent with the idea that the government had overclaimed NSC in 
past security certificate cases. Some of the new allegations included in 
the public documents include allegations that Adil Charkaoui was 
overheard discussing a 1998 stay in a terrorist training camp in 
Afghanistan; that Mahmoud Jaballah was in regular contact with al-
Qaeda’s second in command, Ayman al Zawahiri after Jaballah came to 
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Canada; that Hassan Almrei gained access to a restricted area of 
Toronto’s Pearson airport shortly after his arrival in Canada and that 
Mohamed Harkat was heard saying in 1998 that he would soon be 
“ready” to take part in jihad.149 The accuracy of these new allegations are 
not known, but the fact that they were revealed in public for the first time 
when new security certificates were filed suggests that the government 
had reconsidered its initial decision that the release of such information 
would harm national security.  
7. Rehabilitating and Disciplining Secrecy Claims 
Given the problems documented above in overclaiming national 
security confidentiality under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act, it 
might be a mistake to amend the reference to harm to national security or 
persons in section 78 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to 
track the broader formulation of harm to international relations, national 
security or national defence found in the CEA. One problem with the 
broad terms used in the CEA is that they can support arguments that 
even asking for amendments of caveats could harm Canada’s relations 
with its allies including perhaps damage caused by embarrassment. The 
Special Senate Committee that conducted a three-year review of the 
Anti-terrorism Act was concerned that the vague reference to 
international relations could be used to shield information that may 
cause some embarrassment to the government.150 
In his section 38 decision with respect to the Arar Commission, Noël 
J. attempted the difficult task of defining the operative terms of section 
38. He suggested that national security “means at minimum the 
preservation of the Canadian way of life, including the safeguarding of 
the security of persons, institutions and freedoms in Canada”.151 
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International relations “refers to information that if disclosed would be 
injurious to Canada’s relations with foreign nations”.152 National defence 
includes “[a]ll measures taken by a nation to protect itself against its 
enemies” and “a nation’s military establishment”.153 Although the 
attempt at definition is admirable, the result is not satisfactory. It is 
difficult to imagine broader and vaguer statutory terms, and these terms 
seem to have become even broader in the process of definition. The 
problem may be the vagueness of the statutory terms. I am reminded of 
my colleague Marty Friedland’s introduction to his study for the 
McDonald Commission: “I start this study on the legal dimensions of 
national security with a confession: I do not know what national security 
means. But then, neither does the government.”154 In the investigative 
hearing cases, the Supreme Court pointedly refused to accept the 
government’s argument that the purpose of the Anti-terrorism Act was to 
protect “national security” in part because of a concern about the 
“rhetorical urgency”155 of the broad term. Although Parliament has made 
a specific choice to use the term “national security” in both section 38 of 
the CEA and section 78 of the IRPA, there is a need to discipline and 
rehabilitate the abused concept. There are some good reasons to protect 
secrets, including threats to the safety of informers, threats to ongoing 
investigations and promises made to our allies. These reasons, however, 
may be lost in references to the vague generalities of national security 
and threats to international relations. 
The breadth of the definitions of national security, national defence 
and international relations may play a role in encouraging the government 
to overclaim NSC. In some respects, references to the vague and 
intangible notions of national security, national defence and international 
relations have taken on a rhetorical life of their own. In my view, 
thought should be given to rebuilding the NSC process from the ground 
up. One possibility would be to list the specific and serious harms that 
the disclosure of secret information can cause in some cases. Section 78 
of the IRPA already starts this process by referring to injury to the safety 
of any person. Greater specificity about the danger to informers or 
undercover agents could perhaps provide even greater discipline to this 
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concept. A disciplined harm-based approach might help the government 
think through their NSC claims and avoid overclaiming in the future. It 
could also address the public suspicion and cynicism that O’Connor J. 
accurately noted would follow patently overbroad NSC claims made by 
the government.  
There are reasons to believe that this may be a particularly opportune 
time to rethink NSC concepts. Several recent decisions have begun to 
question some of the main pillars of our traditional approach to NSC. 
The courts have begun to re-examine one old chestnut, namely, the 
government’s penchant for invoking the mosaic effect as justification for 
withholding information that might on its face appear innocuous. The 
informed reader that the mosaic effect has traditionally been concerned 
with is a member of a well-resourced foreign intelligence agency such as 
the former KGB. Although some terrorist groups may try to develop a 
web-based counter-intelligence capacity, they do not have the resources 
of the KGB. Both Mosley J. and Noël J. have recently warned that 
mechanical invocation of the mosaic effect will not be sufficient to 
justify a non-disclosure claim.156 In my view, the mosaic effect has its 
roots in concerns about counter-intelligence and the Cold War when the 
usual remedy was continued surveillance or expulsion of suspected 
spies. Its use should be rethought in a context in which secrecy claims 
are made to withhold information from suspected terrorists who face 
prolonged deprivations of liberty under immigration or criminal law. In 
the contemporary context, there may be both less harm from disclosure 
of “apparently innocuous information” and more harm from its non-
disclosure. 
Even the most basic rule of the NSC regime, the third party rule that 
prohibits the disclosure of caveated information without the permission 
of the originating agency, is being rethought in light of new realities and 
new developments such as changes in information technology and the 
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growth of information that is in the public domain. Justice O’Connor in 
the Arar Commission report stressed that caveats are not absolute 
barriers to the further disclosure of information. They simply establish 
proper channels for the authorization of further disclosure.157 The Arar 
Commission also raised concerns about applying the third party rule to 
information that is already in the public domain.158  
The Arar Commission is not alone in questioning a mechanical 
application of the third party rule. Justice Mosley in Khawaja has 
observed that although it is important, the third party rule “is not all 
encompassing”. He expressed agreement with the proposition that “it is 
not open to the Attorney General to merely claim that information 
cannot be disclosed pursuant to the third party rule, if a request for 
disclosure in some form has not in fact been made to the original foreign 
source”.159 He also indicated that the third party rule does not protect the 
existence of relationships where no information is exchanged or apply to 
information that the Canadian agency was aware of before receiving the 
information from the foreign source.160 These are significant and 
emerging limitations on the scope of the third party rule that take into 
account changing circumstances. There may be a case for including them 
in a new and more specific harm based approach that moves beyond the 
discredited generalities of references to national security or international 
relations. 
The above discussion of the dangers of overclaiming could have 
been relevant to Parliament’s response to Charkaoui in a number of 
ways. Parliament could have taken the opportunity to provide a role for 
special advocates in all proceedings in which the government claims 
national security confidentiality without the other side being present. By 
providing adversarial challenge to all claims of secrecy, an expanded 
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special advocate system would have placed government claims of 
secrecy under more critical scrutiny.  
Another pre-emptive response to past experiences with overclaiming 
would have been for Parliament to have attempted to categorize with 
more precision the range of legitimate secrets and harms to national 
security both as they are defined under IRPA and section 38 of the 
Canada Evidence Act. Indeed, reform of the section 38 process might 
become an even more urgent priority had policy-makers reached the 
conclusion that deportation or indeterminate detention of the five men 
presently held under security certificates was not sustainable. When such 
conclusions are reached, then it becomes even more important that the 
criminal process be able to respond to the challenges of terrorism 
prosecutions. In such a scenario, Canada must be prepared to seek non-
disclosure orders under section 38 in a disciplined and timely fashion in 
order to protect promises made to allies, confidential sources of 
information and ongoing investigations.  
The end game and the exit strategy with respect to security 
certificates may be the use of the criminal process, including the use of a 
reformed section 38 process. In Bill C-3, however, Parliament did not 
address either the sustainability of security certificates or the need to 
discipline secrecy claims.  
8. Summary 
Parliament’s response to Charkaoui was an example of dialogue, but 
a truncated dialogue that did not capitalize on the ability of the legislature 
to place the particular issues examined by the courts into a larger policy 
context. Bill C-3 is partial dialogue because it ignores larger questions 
about how secret information is treated in other legal proceedings. It 
only makes special advocates available in immigration proceedings and 
it fails to address any of the causes of overclaiming of secrecy including 
the breadth and vagueness of the concept of causing harm to national 
security.  
Although Bill C-3 addressed the issue of intelligence produced by 
torture, the legislation, as well as the Court in Charkaoui, ducked the 
question of whether the government should be allowed to continue to 
rely on the infamous Suresh161 exception that contemplates deportation to 
                                                                                                             
161
  Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 
1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) CHARKAOUI AND BILL C-3 349 
torture. Although it appears increasingly unlikely that courts will approve 
the use of such an exception, its potential availability can play a role in 
sustaining the illusion that indeterminate detention is still related to 
deportation. It would have been best for the government to face up to the 
fact that it will not be able to deport the detainees to Egypt and Syria and 
likely not to Morocco or Algeria. Such a realization would have forced 
the government to recognize that the security certificate regime is not 
sustainable. Instead, the government interpreted the refusal of the Court 
to strike down prolonged detention under security certificates as an 
indication that the security certificate regime is, except for the absence of 
adversarial challenge, fundamentally sound. Although the Supreme 
Court in Charkaoui sent some hints that indeterminate detention, even 
under strict conditions of house arrest, will eventually become 
unconstitutional and may well become unconstitutional if there is no 
reasonable prospect of deportation, Parliament ignored these warnings 
and decided to wait until the courts finally say enough is enough. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision in Charkaoui does not resolve most of the 
outstanding issues with respect to security certificates. One limit of 
judicial policy-making is that courts are to some extent captives of the 
case before them. Courts can push against the episodic nature of judicial 
policymaking by deciding issues that may not be strictly necessary to 
resolve the dispute or they can embrace it by adopting a form of judicial 
minimalism that focuses on the case before them. The Court’s approach 
in Charkaoui tended towards minimalism. Constitutional minimalism 
has been defended as a form of judicial review that maximizes space for 
legislative policy-making and recognizes the limits of the judiciary’s 
ability to make policy.162 Contrary to this theory, however, the Court’s 
minimalism in Charkaoui appears to maximize the ability of courts, not 
legislatures, to make important decisions in future cases. Thus the 
Court’s decision in Charkaoui leaves it to other courts to decide whether 
the Suresh exception for deportation to torture will be utilized. In turn, 
other courts will have to decide whether the possible application of the 
Suresh exception will justify long-term detention as necessarily tied to 
deportation or whether rejection of the exception will lead to a conclusion 
that continued detention violates the Charter. The day of reckoning both 
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with respect to deportation to torture and the limits of indeterminate 
detention under security certificates was only postponed by Charkaoui 
and Bill C-3. Such a postponement has huge costs for the detainees who, 
even when released from actual imprisonment, are detained under strict 
conditions. The dialogue produced by Charkaoui failed to deal with the 
issues of continued detention and the possibility of deportation to torture 
that are likely the main concerns of the detainees.  
The Court only addressed the need for adversarial challenge with 
respect to secret evidence used in security certificate cases. The Court’s 
focus in this respect is easier to defend than its avoidance of deportation 
of torture and indeterminate detention because Charkaoui only raised 
immigration law issues. Parliament, however, was not the captive of the 
Charkaoui case. It could have followed the advice it received from its 
Parliamentary committees and made special advocates available in other 
proceedings where secret evidence is used. Parliament’s failure to do so, 
however, will leave these questions to be determined by the judiciary on 
a case by case basis.  
Parliament also deferred to the judiciary the critical questions of 
whether special advocates will be able to consult with detainees and 
others after they have seen the secret information and whether special 
advocates will be able to demand further disclosure and call witnesses. 
All of these activities may in some cases be critical to the ability of 
special advocates effectively to challenge the government’s case against 
the detainees. If the presiding Federal Court judges are cautious about 
allowing special advocates to play this more robust role because of 
concerns about the inadvertent leakage of secrets, then special advocates 
will not likely be successful in providing adversarial challenge to the 
secret evidence. This is unfortunate because both counsel representing 
SIRC and commission counsel in the Arar Commission had more 
flexibility with respect to their ability to question affected persons and 
their lawyers after having seen the secret information or to demand 
further disclosure from the government.  
The fact that Parliament has selected the regime of adversarial 
challenge that is most sensitive to the state’s interest in preserving 
secrets should not be surprising, especially given Canada’s notorious 
anxiety about being a net importer of intelligence. Nevertheless, 
Parliament’s decision will adversely affect the detainee’s interests in 
having the most effective challenge to the government’s secret evidence. 
It is possible that special advocates may be reluctant to request the 
presiding judge for further powers because of a fear of signalling their 
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case to the government. Under either of the above scenarios, the main 
flaws identified by the Supreme Court in Charkaoui — the lack of 
effective challenge to the government’s secret case against the detainee 
— would remain largely unaddressed. That said, special advocates could 
still play a valuable role in providing adversarial challenges to 
governmental claims about the need for secrecy. In fulfilling this role, 
special advocates may very well be able to push more of the 
government’s case into the open where the detainee and his lawyers can 
mount their own effective challenge. If past experiences with overclaiming 
of secrecy by the government are any indication, special advocates may 
enjoy considerable success when they engage in adversarial challenge to 
governmental claims of secrecy even though the judges presiding in 
security certificate cases continue to be required to prohibit disclosure 
once they conclude that the release of information will harm national 
security or other persons. Indeed, the government’s decision to make 
public much more of the secret intelligence that it had previously used to 
justify the security certificates suggests that the special advocate regime 
has already won a significant victory for more generous disclosure to the 
detainees.  
Although the independent security-cleared counsel contemplated by 
the Court in Charkaoui and created in Bill C-3 could help combat 
overclaiming of secrecy, its role in ensuring the fair treatment of the 
accused is more problematic. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in 
Charkaoui focused on the role that security-cleared amicus curiae 
played in the Arar Commission in challenging and evaluating the 
government’s claims to secrecy. The Supreme Court did not discuss the 
more important role played by security-cleared Commission counsel in 
ensuring that the government disclosed all relevant information; in 
calling and cross-examining relevant witnesses; and in consulting with 
Mr. Arar and his counsel after Commission counsel had examined the 
secret information. Any new security-cleared counsel that is injected into 
the security certificate process that cannot play such a role will be, at 
best, a half measure.  
An Arar-style amicus curiae or one based on British special 
advocates may respond to the manifest danger of overclaiming of NSC, 
but it will be at a disadvantage in responding to the dangers of unfair and 
inaccurate decisions based on secret material. The special advocate may 
have to be allowed to demand further disclosure, call witnesses and 
interview the detainees and others about the secret material in order to be 
able effectively to challenge that material. Effective challenge will also 
352 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
require the special advocate to be able to make informed arguments that 
the secret evidence has been obtained as a result of torture or cruel, 
inhumane and degrading treatment or that it is irrelevant when it is 
assessed in its proper context. Under Bill C-3, judges will make 
decisions about whether it is necessary for special advocates to consult 
the detainee or others after having seen the secret information or demand 
further disclosure on a case-by-case basis.  
There is a danger that attempting to “Charter proof” security 
certificates by adding security-cleared special advocates to the process 
will gloss over more fundamental questions about the fairness of relying 
on secret intelligence as opposed to evidence to justify indeterminate 
detention or deportation of suspected terrorists. Moreover, Bill C-3 does 
not address the critical question of the ultimate disposition of the 
security certificate detainees given concerns that they will be tortured if 
deported and that the tight conditions of qualified release that have been 
placed on them will eventually become intolerable and unconstitutional. 
Bill C-3 does not even address some of the most important questions 
about the role of special advocates including whether they will be able to 
consult with detainees after having seen the secret information and whether 
they will be able to demand further disclosure from the government or 
call their own witnesses. Bill C-3 leaves those questions to the decision 
of the judges presiding at security certificate proceedings.  
The extent of the dialogue between Parliament and the courts will 
depend on the willingness of both institutions to play their respective roles. 
In Charkaoui, the Court took a relatively minimalist approach to the 
exercise of its role in determining whether the security certificate regime 
was consistent with the Charter. In Bill C-3, Parliament similarly 
pursued a minimalist agenda with respect to reform of security 
certificates and delegated some of the most important and difficult issues 
to the courts. 
The dialogue model which facilitates legislative responses to Charter 
decisions provides an opportunity for the legislature to place the 
injustices revealed by successful Charter litigation into a larger context. 
But dialogic constitutionalism only provides such an opportunity, it does 
not guarantee it. It could not be otherwise in a model that claims to be 
democratic and to preserve the prerogatives of the elected legislatures to 
make good or bad policy or to decline to make policy at all. Bill C-3 
largely failed to take the opportunity of expanding the policy debate in 
responding to Charkaoui to deal with other issues concerning the 
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sustainability of security certificates or the treatment of information that 
the government claims should be secret. 
Even if Bill C-3 is found to be a perfectly acceptable response to 
Charkaoui that allows adversarial challenge to secret evidence and 
ensures fair treatment of detainees in that particular respect, it is only a 
matter of time before detainees bring Charter challenges to the long-term 
restrictions on their liberty that have been imposed under security 
certificates and before it is recognized that the detainees face a 
substantial risk of torture if they are returned to their home countries. 
The day of reckoning on torture and indeterminate detention with respect 
to security certificates awaits. Meanwhile the detainees must wait and 
live under very tight controls. The detainees eventually will be released 
because the status quo even after Bill C-3 is not and should not be 
sustainable. At that point in time, there may be another day of reckoning 
with respect to the viability of criminal prosecutions as an alternative to 
the extraordinary procedures of security certificates. As suggested above, 
such prosecutions will implicate the way that the government treats 
secret information and the need for a fair and efficient process to 
determine what material can be subject to non-disclosure under section 
38 of the Canada Evidence Act. Although cases such as Charkaoui and 
Khadr focus on extraordinary procedures, there is a need to ensure that 
the criminal process remains a viable response to the threat of terrorism 
and a fairer alternative to reliance on extraordinary procedures.  
Charkaoui and Bill C-3 are only partial responses to the many 
dilemmas raised by security certificates and secrecy. They provide some 
improvements on the margin, but much work remains to be done. The 
detainees will have no choice but to continue to challenge in court their 
indeterminate detention and their possible deportation to torture. They 
may also challenge the adequacy of the new special advocate regime. 
Charkaoui and Bill C-3 only represent a minimalist episode in a 
continued dialogue between courts and legislatures that must occur about 
the justice and necessity of the security certificate regime.  
  
